Apprendi’s Limits†
An unprecedented transformation has occurred in the law of criminal sentencing.
Although that transformation once drew less attention than it deserved, it has now provoked
remarkable public comment.1 In particular, two pending cases invite the Court to interpret last
year’s decision, Blakely v. Washington,2 which one jurist heralded as “the most important
criminal justice decision, not just of this past term, not just of this decade, . . . but perhaps in the
history of the Supreme Court.”3 The excitement is understandable. Academic and popular
commentators have unanimously construed Blakely to mean that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; such a conclusion would invalidate many
thousands of sentences and would alter the implementation of federal criminal law forever.4
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In dissent from the popular consensus, this Article suggests that neither Blakely nor its
precursors invalidate the Federal Guidelines, and that the Court this term will confront an open
question in deciding whether the Guidelines violate defendants’ constitutional rights. More
importantly, this Article will analyze the nature of the rights asserted in the pending cases, and
will propose a theoretical explanation for why the Federal Guidelines should be upheld. In my
view, the Federal Guidelines are valid because they impose no punishment above the maximum
authorized by the jury’s verdict. For constitutional purposes, a jury’s verdict authorizes any
sentence up to the maximum prescribed by the crime of conviction. Because federal crimes and
their maximum sentences are defined by statute, the Constitution is not violated by nonstatutory
Guidelines that prescribe sentences less than that statutory maximum. My theoretical argument
finds support in the Court’s recent jurisprudence, and particularly in views of the Sentencing
Revolution’s surprising swing voter: Justice Antonin Scalia. Without venturing to predict his
vote in the pending cases, I suggest that Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence concerning separation of
powers and formality tend to support a limited constitutional ruling that would reject Fifth and
Sixth Amendment challenges to the Federal Guidelines.
A.

Background
The landmark case in modern sentencing law is Apprendi v. New Jersey, which prohibits

judges from imposing any sentence above the “statutory maximum” for a defendant’s crime of
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conviction.5 The Apprendi Court invalidated a New Jersey law that allowed the sentencing judge
to impose an “enhanced sentence,” greater than the ten-year statutory maximum for firearm
possession, based on a judge’s post-conviction finding that the defendant’s offense qualified as a
“hate crime.”6 With deceptive simplicity, Apprendi held that where a defendant is convicted of a
crime whose statutory maximum is ten years’ imprisonment, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
bar the judge from imposing a prison term longer than that.7 To impose an “enhanced” sentence
greater than the statutory maximum would be in effect to convict a defendant of one crime, yet
sentence her for a different one. Apprendi thus forbids the use of any contested fact to increase a
sentence beyond the crime of conviction’s statutory maximum, unless that fact is alleged in the
indictment and proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt, like any other element of a separate,
“aggravated” offense.8
From the start, four dissenting Justices expressed fears that Apprendi’s effects would be
broader than its terms.9 Apprendi to them embodied a radical ideal that, if not limited to
sentences above statutory maxima, might overthrow two principles of modern sentencing, and
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prior Supreme Court case law as well. First, the dissenters were concerned with Apprendi’s
occasional reference to facts that alter a defendant’s “range” of available sentences.10 Such an
approach, focused on the sentencing range open to an individual judge’s discretion, would imply
that statutory minima require the same constitutional constraints as statutory maxima; thus,
judges could not impose a “mandatory minimum” sentence unless its factual basis appeared in
the indictment and was proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt.11 The risk that Apprendi
would regulate statutory minima was important because the Court had upheld mandatory minima
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,12 and many sentences were later imposed under statutes that
embodied McMillan’s rule.13
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The dissenters’ second concern was thatApprendi might forbid judicial sentence
enhancements above any legal baseline, regardless of the statutory maximum. As the dissenters
knew well, the United States Sentencing Guidelines depend on nonstatutory enhancements.14
The Guidelines provide that no sentence may be imposed in excess of the crime of conviction’s
statutory maximum.15 But the typical case requires a judge to calculate and modify the
defendant’s “base offense level” using factual findings that do not derive from the indictment or
the offense of conviction.16
Imagine, for example, a person convicted of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),
which provides a twenty-year maximum sentence where a jury finds that the defendant forcibly
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circumstances present during delivery of controlled substance); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 6317(b)
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9717(a) (West 1998) (victim is over 60 years of age and not a police officer); 42 PA. CONST.
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involving serious bodily injury or death); Virgin Islands Gun Control Act of 2001, 2001 V.I.
SESS. LAWS 6493.
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took something of value from a designated banking institution.17 Under the Federal Guidelines, a
convicted defendant might receive thirty-one to forty-one months if the sentencing judge found
no evidence of the amount stolen, but forty-one to fifty-one months if the sentencing judge found
that $200,000 was stolen.18 The dissenters recognized that applying Apprendi to nonstatutory
maxima, such as “base offense levels” under the Guidelines, might unsettle numerous federal
sentences imposed since the Federal Guidelines took effect in 1987.19
A third, minor concern involved Arizona’s capital punishment system, which the Court
had previously upheld.20 Although Apprendi’s majority claimed that its decision did not affect
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the Arizona death penalty,21 the Court reversed course in Ring v. Arizona and held that Arizona’s
capital system improperly relied on judicial “aggravating factors” to kill defendants whose crime
of conviction’s statutory maximum was life imprisonment.22
The dissenters’ fears about mandatory minima and the Federal Guidelines were not
immediately realized. In Harris v. United States, the Court confirmed that McMillan remains
good law, that statutory minima are different from statutory maxima, and that judges may apply
statutory minima based on factual judgments that do not derive from “elements” of the crime of
conviction.23 The Guidelines’ constitutionality seemed similarly secure. After Apprendi, every
circuit court held that nonstatutory guideline enhancements do not violate the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments because the Guidelines cannot yield a sentence greater than the crime of
conviction’s statutory maximum.24 Numerous defendants sought review of those appellate
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124 S. Ct. 2429; United States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 613; United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 925-26 (6th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.1005 (2003); United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 38 (1st Cir. 2002),
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decisions, but the Court consistently denied certiorari, suggesting that the dissenters might have
overstated Apprendi’s disruptive potential.25
Then came Blakely v. Washington.26 In Blakely, the Court applied Apprendi to invalidate
a sentence imposed under Washington state law. The relevant provisions warrant more attention,
but for now it is sufficient to note that Washington’s statutory system of punishment and the
Federal Guidelines were strikingly similar in content.27 Indeed, the United States supported
Washington and admitted that any differences between the state and federal systems might not
“be sufficient [to save the Federal Guidelines] if this Court applied Apprendi” to Washington’s
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2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 937 (2001); United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1177 (2001); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 n.3 (11th
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See supra note 24 (collecting cases). Two other factors mitigated Apprendi’s immediate
practical effect. The first is the Court’s refusal to overrule Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224
(1998), which permits judges to enhance a criminal sentence above the statutory maximum based
on a defendant’s criminal history. But cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(indicating that his necessary fifth vote as part of the Almedarez-Torres majority was based on
“an error”); Shepard v. United States, 03-9168, cert. granted, June 21, 2004 (raising
constitutional questions regarding the treatment of criminal history). Second, the Court’s
unanimous decision in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), held that Apprendi errors
not raised at the time of trial — i.e., almost all of them before 1999 — are reviewed under
stringent standards of “plain error.” Cotton thus allowed the government to adapt to Apprendi’s
rule prospectively without disrupting large numbers of past sentences.
26
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See infra pp. 16-18. The dissenting Justices in Blakely repeatedly referred to
Washington’s system as a “sentencing guideline scheme[],” e.g., id. at 2543 (O’Connor, J.),
thereby seeking to stress its substantive similarity to the Federal Guidelines. The opinion of the
Court, however, did not refer to Washington’s system as “guidelines.” This Article follows the
latter convention.
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statutory scheme.28 That concession, whether or not accurate, advised the Court that any opinion
in Blakely would at least abut the dominant question that has loomed since Apprendi: whether
enhanced sentences under the Federal Guidelines are unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the Court’s
opinion in Blakely — like that in Apprendi — expressly disavowed any view about the Federal
Guidelines’ constitutionality.29
Despite the Court’s reticence, the reaction to Blakely has been overwhelming. It was no
surprise that Apprendi’s dissenters dissented again, but their rhetoric describing Blakely’s effect
on the Federal Guidelines was unsettling.30 Without mentioning prior prophecies concerning

28

Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America at 9, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632); see also id. at 29-30 (“It is . . . not certain that this Court would
ultimately conclude that the differences between the Washington system and the federal
Guidelines are of constitutional magnitude.”).
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Indeed, the language used by the Court in Apprendi and Blakely is markedly similar.
Compare Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9 (“The United States, as amicus curiae, urges us to
affirm. It notes differences between Washington’s sentencing regime and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines but questions whether those differences are constitutionally significant. The Federal
Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.” (citation omitted)), with
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21 (“The [Federal] Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court.
We therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held.” (citing
Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) (holding that the Constitution permits a
sentencing judge to determine drug type and quantity for guidelines purposes regardless of the
jury’s verdict, so long as the ultimate sentence lies “within the statutory limits” relevant to the
crime of conviction))).
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Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is no answer to say that
today’s opinion impacts only Washington’s scheme and not others, such as, for example, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. . . . Indeed, [Washington’s] provision struck down today is as
inoffensive to the holding of Apprendi as a regime of guided discretion could possibly be. . . . If
the Washington scheme does not comport with the Constitution, it is hard to imagine a guidelines
system that would.”); 124 S. Ct. at 2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Until now, I would have
thought the Court might have limited Apprendi so that its underlying principle would not undo
sentencing reform efforts. Today’s case dispels that illusion. . . . Perhaps the Court will
distinguish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but I am uncertain how.”).
9

mandatory minima, Justice O’Connor’s Blakely dissent direly proclaimed that “[w]hat I have
feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens
of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeopardy.”31 Later, Justice O’Connor characterized the
Blakely Court’s decision-making as “disgusting” and its result as a “No. 10 earthquake.”32
As though to fulfill such forecasts, the appellate courts generated what must be one of the
quickest, most robust circuit conflicts on record. Discarding earlier case law as “of course no
longer authoritative,”33 Judge Posner wrote for a divided Seventh Circuit panel that guideline
enhancements are invalid under Blakely; a divided Ninth Circuit panel agreed.34 In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit held that Blakely does not alter prior precedents upholding the Federal Guidelines;
the Fourth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits also reached that result.35 The Second Circuit, sitting en
banc, took the unusual response of certifying a request for Supreme Court guidance on whether
guideline enhancements remain constitutionally valid, and also “request[ed]” expedited briefing
and argument before the Court’s term was scheduled to begin.36
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Id. at 2550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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O’Connor Disgusted by Federal Sentencing Case, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/022/oconnor.sentences.ap (July 23, 2004) [hereinafter
“O’Connor Disgusted”].
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United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. July 9, 2004), cert. granted, No.
04-104 (Aug. 2, 2004).
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Id.; United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004).
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United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004); accord United States v. Reese,
No. 03-1317 (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2004); United States v. Koch, 2004 WL 1899930 (6th Cir. Aug.
26, 2004); United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004).
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United States v. Peneranda, 375 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit later
sided with the majority of circuits that have upheld the Guidelines. United States v. Mincey,
10

Nor did commentators calm the waters. The nation’s most respected legal scholars
assigned Blakely blockbuster status, and the academic and popular press have, without exception,
characterized the Guidelines’ invalidity as a foregone conclusion.37 After a Judiciary Committee
Hearing, the Senate unanimously resolved that the Supreme Court should address Blakely’s
aftermath quickly.38 Twelve days later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two guideline
cases, United States v. Booker39 and United States v. Fanfan,40 capping what was a very busy
summer for sentencing law.
B.

A New Approach
This Article presents an uncommon view of the Supreme Court’s sentencing cases,

suggesting that the best interpretation of such cases would uphold the Federal Guidelines. Part
One responds to the argument, in the media and some federal courts, that there is no need for
analysis because Blakely as much as held the Federal Guidelines unconstitutional. After
examining the decision’s language and context, I argue that Blakely did not resolve any issue
essential to the Guidelines’ status. As the Court explained, Washington’s statutory system was
effectively identical to the New Jersey statutes in Apprendi; thus, Blakely broke little new legal

2004 WL 1794717 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2004) (per curiam).
37

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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S. Con. Res. 130, 108th Cong. (2004) (“Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate
(the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the Supreme
Court of the United States should act expeditiously to resolve the current confusion and
inconsistency in the Federal criminal justice system by promptly considering and ruling on the
constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”).
39

No. 04-104.

40

No. 04-105.
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ground. In particular, the key question regarding the Guidelines remains unanswered: Neither
Blakely nor Apprendi considered the validity of non-statutory limits on sentencing judges’
discretion. Although certain ambiguous language in Blakely could be read as addressing the
Federal Guidelines, the opinion’s text does not require that interpretation, which would in any
event contradict the Court’s clear statement that it “express[ed] no opinion” about the
Guidelines.41
Because Blakely did not legally resolve the Guidelines’ constitutional status, the decision
is important primarily as a predictive signal of what the Court will hold in Booker. Even as a
matter of Court-watching, however, Blakely’s clearest message may be that the Apprendi/Blakely
majority (Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg) has at least one member with uncertain or
divergent views about the Guidelines’ status. The “swing vote” in other Apprendi cases is
Blakely’s author, Justice Scalia, which tends to confirm that Blakely left the Guidelines’
constitutionality an open question, and perhaps not an easy one.
Part Two pursues theoretical issues that risk being lost in Blakely’s shadow.42 Beneath
controversies over the Guidelines’ constitutionality lie fundamental disagreements about the type
of constitutional right that is at stake. I discuss three models of Apprendi rights and ultimately
defend a theory rooted in separation of powers principles. The Federal Guidelines are distinct

41

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9.

42

Most scholars have turned their attention to what would happen if the Court does find
the Guidelines to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Devil You Know:
Federal Sentencing After Blakely, 16 Fed. Sent. Rep. 312 (2004); Douglas A. Berman,
Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 Fed. Sent. Rep. 307 (2004); Nancy J.
King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 Fed. Sent. Rep. 316 (2004); Mark Osler, The
Blakely Problem and the 3x Solution, 16 Fed. Sent. Rep. 344 (2004). Such well-traveled
questions will not be considered here.
12

from Washington’s system because the former are rules of an independent agency within the
judicial branch, while the latter are statutes. That difference is significant, and not only because,
as Judge Easterbrook observes, the Court has repeatedly used the term “statutory maximum” in
its definitions of Apprendi rights.43 In my view, Apprendi’s procedural right depends on the
maximum sentence that is “authorized by the jury’s verdict.”44 Such authorization in turn
depends on the legal provision that defines the crime of conviction; it does not depend on other
provisions that may affect the sentence that is actually imposed. Notwithstanding other potential
difficulties in identifying the definition of a crime, it is at least clear that under federal law,
crimes can be defined only by congressional statutes, not by nonstatutory Guidelines from the
Sentencing Commission. Accordingly, Apprendi should not apply to Guidelines that limit
judicial discretion but are not statutes and do not define crimes.45
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United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d at 518 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Attributing to
Blakely the view that it does not matter whether a given rule appears in a statute makes hash of
‘statutory maximum.’ Why did the Justices deploy that phrase in Apprendi and repeat it in
Blakely (and quite a few other decisions)? Just to get a chuckle at the expense of other judges
who took them seriously and thought that ‘statutory maximum’ might have something to do with
statutes? Why write ‘statutory maximum’ if you mean ‘all circumstances that go into ascertaining
the proper sentence’?”).
44

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494; accord Harris, 536 U.S. at 557, 565, 568; Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 490 n.16, 494; id. see also Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538.
45

The only part of the Guidelines enacted by statute is the Prosecutorial Remedies and
Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Public. L. No. 108-21, §
401(i), 117 Stat. 650, 672-73 (2003). There, Congress provided increases in a defendant’s
offense level for trafficking in specified numbers of images that involve the sexual exploitation
of a minor, and similar increases for possessing specified numbers of images that depict a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Although both of those provisions clearly qualify as
“statutory,” they do not produce any “statutory maximum” sentence nor do they define any crime.
Thus, such guidelines would most likely not be covered by Apprendi, though for different
reasons than are applicable to the rest of the Federal Guidelines, which do not qualify as statutory
maxima in any sense. But see Steven L. Chanenson, Host With Their Own Petard?, 17 FED.
13

Apprendi requires a constitutional link between the statutory definition of a crime, the
jury’s decision to convict of the crime, and the maximum sentence imposed therefor. That
connection is important, but it is also limited. Because of Congress’s unique role in defining
crimes and their punishments, Apprendi bars only sentences above the statutory maximum and
does not regulate submaximal sentences under nonstatutory Guidelines.
Finally, Part Three looks ahead to Booker, where the Court will finally resolve whether
the Guidelines violate Apprendi. Whether or not the Court upholds the Guidelines, reflection is
apt as to how the Blakely “crisis” emerged, and how it could have been avoided. The particular
incidents that have followed in Blakely’s wake indicate potentially important and enduring
lessons about the roles of certain “repeat players” in the judicial process of constitutional
rulemaking.
I.

Blakely And The Power Of Dissents
A.

Blakely and Apprendi

A detail often overlooked in current sentencing discussions is that, after Apprendi,
Blakely’s result was easy and required little new analysis. Indeed, the Blakely opinion starts with
an explicitly modest self-image: “This case requires us to apply the rule we expressed in
Apprendi v. New Jersey: . . . ‘[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”46 The Court’s analysis is short and simple, and over half of the opinion rebuts

SENT. REP. ___ (forthcoming 2004) (arguing that those two statutory amendments render all of
the Federal Guidelines statutory and, thus, subject to Apprendi).
46

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2436 (citation omitted).
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dissenters’ objections, most of which were previously aired and rejected in Apprendi.47
Nonetheless, the dissenters in Blakely, joined by numerous commentators, have argued that that
case effectively determined that the Federal Guidelines are unconstitutional.48 The first step to
understanding Apprendi and the Guidelines is thus to challenge that claim and show that the
Guidelines’ constitutional status after Blakely is as unresolved as it was before.
The Court in Apprendi considered a New Jersey statute that defined unlawful firearm
possession with a maximum sentence of ten years,49 and another statute whose hate-crime
enhancement allowed a twenty-year maximum sentence based on preponderance-of-evidence
judicial findings.50 Through those two provisions, New Jersey’s legislature sought to provide a
“true maximum sentence” (my phrase) of twenty years for unlawful firearm possession. That is,
the legislature authorized a twenty-year sentence for some convicted firearm defendants, but also
prescribed that judges should reserve the range’s top half for those criminals who were motivated
by discriminatory animus.
Apprendi held New Jersey’s scheme unconstitutional, but what the Court did not hold is
also important. The Court found nothing inherently unsound about New Jersey’s having a
twenty-year maximum sentence for unlawful firearm possession. Moreover, if New Jersey had
passed a twenty-year maximum for all unlawful firearm possession, New Jersey judges could
have decided on their own to apply sentences of more than ten years exclusively to

47

Id. at 2438-43; see also id. at 2536-37 nn.5-6.

48

See supra notes 1, 3-4, 31-33 and accompanying text.

49

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995).

50

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West 1995).
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hate-criminals. New Jersey’s problem lay in the method used to pursue its goals. The Supreme
Court held that New Jersey could not define a crime with one maximum sentence, but authorize
judges to impose a sentence greater than that.51 The Court found that, in taking the “second
step,” New Jersey created a special crime of “hateful firearm possession,” and allowed the
elemental finding of group-based animus to be made without the safeguard of jury trial beyond
reasonable doubt.52 In simplest terms, the Court found that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
prohibited New Jersey from convicting Apprendi of one crime and sentencing him for another.
As should be evident, Apprendi’s critical move was to characterize New Jersey’s scheme
as two formal steps, not as a functional whole authorizing twenty-year sentences for some
firearm violators.53 Apprendi fired bullets into the home of an African-American family because,
the judge found, he disliked having neighbors who were “black in color.”54 New Jersey’s
political branches intended and provided that such defendants should be eligible for a sentence
higher than ten years,55 yet the Constitution barred the State from fulfilling its intent by
exceeding the crime of conviction’s statutory maximum.

51

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

52

Similarly, in Apprendi’s precursor, Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. at 227, the Court
construed the federal carjacking statute, contrary to its terms, as creating three different crimes,
such that the elements of each must be presented in the indictment and to the petit jury. The
“constitutional doubt” that was avoided in Jones has now become the constitutional rule after
Apprendi.
53

A functional interpretation would not find important that the State failed to revise its
ten-year “maximum.” The State’s goals seem evident from the statutes as written.
54

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.

55

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West 1995).
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In Blakely, Washington’s statutory scheme was phrased differently from Apprendi’s
hate-crime enhancement, but its constitutional dimensions were the same. Like New Jersey,
Washington provided a statutory maximum for the defendant’s crime of conviction, yet imposed
a sentence greater than that maximum. Before 1981, Washington felonies were statutorily
classified as “Class A,” “Class B,” or “Class C,” and the same maximum sentence applied to all
felonies in a class.56 For example, all Class B felonies had a statutory maximum sentence of ten
years, and sentencing judges had broad discretion to impose any punishment below that
maximum.57 Washington’s legislature was dissatisfied because judicial discretion could assign
the same sentence defendants convicted of different crimes, while defendants convicted of the
same crime received different sentences.58
Thus, Washington enacted a Sentencing Reform Act,59 under which felonies received an
“offense seriousness level” that was combined on a two-dimensional “grid” with a defendant’s
“offender score” to produce a statutory “standard sentencing range.”60 Also by statute,
Washington provided that an “exceptional sentence” greater than that “standard sentencing

56

Apprendi, 124 S. Ct. at 2544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

57

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.020(1)(b); cf. State v.Walker, 619 P.2d 699, 700 n.1
(Wash. App. 1980).
58

David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME
AND JUSTICE 71, 126-28 (M. Tonry, ed. 2001). Similar problems arose with respect to other
jurisdictions’ “indeterminate sentencing” schemes. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 38 (1983);
U.S.S.C.A.N. 1983, 3182, 3221 (Senate Report on precursor to federal Sentencing Reform Act of
1984); Breyer, supra note 5, at 5.
59

1981 WASH. LAWS, ch. 137, p. 534.

60

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.120, 9.94A.310 (2000).
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range” could be imposed only if the judge found “substantial and compelling reasons justifying
an exceptional sentence.”61 Regardless of any “exceptional sentence,” however, Washington’s
preexisting limits for classes of felony (e.g., ten years for Class B) remained in effect.62
The facts of Blakely illustrate how the Washington statutes worked in practice. Blakely
was indicted for second-degree kidnaping; he pleaded guilty to that offense and acknowledged
that he used a firearm.63 By statute, a second-degree kidnaping conviction carried an offense
seriousness level of V and, because kidnaping is a crime of violence, an offender score of 2.64
Under the State’s grid, a conviction of second-degree kidnaping thus carried a standard
sentencing range of at least thirteen to seventeen months,65 and use of a firearm increased that
offense level by thirty-six months.66 Because Blakely’s plea agreement acknowledged firearm
use, his statutory sentencing range was therefore forty-nine to fifty-three months.67
Washington provided that, where a sentencing judge found that the offense was
committed with “deliberate cruelty,” the judge could impose an “exceptional sentence” of up to

61

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120 (2000); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.390 (2000) (providing an illustrative list of factors that may be considered in imposing
an exceptional sentence).
62

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.420 (2000).

63

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534; see WASH. STAT. CODE REV. §§ 9A.40.030(1),
10.99.020(3)(p), 9.94A.125 (2000).
64

WASH. STAT. CODE REV. §§ 9.94A.320 & App. 27, 9.94A.360 (2000).

65

WASH. STAT. CODE REV. § 9.94A (2000).

66

WASH. STAT. CODE REV. § 9.94A.310(3)(b) (2000).

67

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534.
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ten years for Class B felonies.68 At Blakely’s sentencing hearing, the court made a sua
sponte finding of deliberate cruelty and imposed an “exceptional sentence” of ninety months.69
Blakely claimed that that sentence violated Apprendi because it increased his sentence above
second-degree kidnaping’s fifty-three-month statutory maximum.70 The sentencing judge
disagreed, holding that the ten-year maximum for Class B felonies was the only relevant
“statutory maximum.”71
In both Apprendi and Blakely, the State sought to authorize different statutory maxima for
defendants who were, in the State’s view, convicted of “the same crime.” The State claimed that,
despite the maximum provided in the statute defining the crime of conviction, the “true
maximum sentence” was that which the judge was allowed to impose post-enhancement.
However, the Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that, when the legislature
authorizes an increased sentence above the statutory maximum, it effectively and impermissibly
creates “two crimes,” without subjecting the aggravating element to jury trial and proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
The State of Washington, and the United States as amicus curiae, claimed that Blakely
differed from Apprendi, but those arguments misunderstood Apprendi’s rule. Washington
argued that its statutory scheme was valid because, unlike Apprendi, Washington judges retained
discretion both to determine whether a case evinced “substantial and compelling reasons

68

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.120, 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2000).

69

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.

70

Id. at 2535.

71

Id. at 2536.
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justifying an exceptional sentence” and to decide what counts as a “substantial and compelling
reason.”72 Even without hindsight, it seems evident that such judicial discretion could not matter.
If New Jersey’s Apprendi problem was that it authorized sentences above the statutory
maximum, that flaw would necessarily persist if enhancements were imposed at the judge’s
option, or if they depended on findings of “hate crime or another appropriately aggravating
factor.” As the Blakely Court held: “Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced
sentence depends on finding a specific fact (as in Apprendi), one of several facts (as in Ring), or
any aggravating fact (as here), it remains the case that the jury’s verdict does not authorize the
sentence.”73
Washington also asked the Supreme Court to defer to state courts’ holdings that the
Sentencing Reform Act did not create new statutory maxima, but merely structured judicial
discretion.74 The Court rejected that notion, repeating its earlier statement that state-law labels

72

Respondent’s Brief at 15-16, 21-26, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No.
02-1632); see also Brief of United States at 14-15, 17-18, 20-22, Blakely (No. 02-1632) (arguing
that Apprendi applies only where the legislature “specifies” a factual finding that would authorize
a sentence above the statutory maximum); id. at 18-20 (claiming that Apprendi applies only to
“factual findings,” not matters of “discretionary judgment”).
73

124 S. Ct. at 2538.

74

Respondent’s Brief at 22-23, 26-27, 31-32, Blakely (No. 02-1632). Washington also
claimed that Apprendi did not govern because the ten-year limit caps any otherwise applicable
“standard sentencing range.” Wash. Br. 17-20. That ten-year limit had no relevance to Blakely’s
sentence, however, and did not change the Court’s determination that Blakely’s sentence was
greater than the statutory maximum for second-degree kidnaping. See id. at 2537 (“[P]etitioner
was sentenced to more than three years above the 53-month statutory maximum of the standard
range because he had acted with ‘deliberate cruelty.’”).
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do not limit Apprendi’s constitutional substance.75 Just as statutory names like “element” or
“sentencing factor” do not control whether a particular finding requires indictment and trial by
jury, the Blakely Court refused to follow state-court denials that Washington had created
“statutory maximum sentences” governed by Apprendi.76 If Blakely has any abiding legal
significance, it is only for having clarified that, as was implicit in Apprendi, the criteria for
determining the relevant “statutory maximum” are matters of federal constitutional law.77 In
other respects, the two cases are nearly identical. Each involved a defendant who was convicted
of one crime and sentenced for another.
B.

Blakely’s “Statutory Maximum”

The parts of Blakely that have received the most attention are the paragraphs that explain
why Blakely’s statutory maximum was fifty-three months, the maximum prescribed for
second-degree kidnaping, not the ten-year maximum applicable to all Class B felonies:
Our precedents make clear . . . [that] the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the

75

124 S. Ct. at 2539 (claiming that “[n]ot even Apprendi’s critics would advocate this
absurd result); Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I believe that the fundamental
meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to
imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives — whether the statute calls
them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane — must be found by the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
76

Cf. id. at 2547 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing state statutes and a state court case as
proof that “Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act did not alter the statutory maximum sentence
to which [Blakely] was exposed”).
77

Although the text states the Court’s dominant thinking on the relationship between state
and federal law under Apprendi, the Court’s broad disdain for state legal characterizations may at
some level conflict with Ring’s statement that “the Arizona court’s construction of the State’s
own law is authoritative.” Ring, 536 U.S. at 603 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691
(1975)).
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facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. See Ring, [536
U.S. at 602] (“‘the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts
reflected in the jury’s verdict alone’” (quoting Apprendi, [530 U.S. at 483]));
Harris v. United States, [536 U.S. at 563] (plurality opinion) (same); cf. Apprendi,
[530 U.S. at 488] (facts admitted by the defendant). In other words, the relevant
“statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after
finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not
allow, the jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the
punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month sentence
solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea. . . . Had the judge
imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he would have
been reversed. The “maximum sentence” is no more 10 years here than it was 20
years in Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon
finding a hate crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have
imposed upon finding an aggravator).78
Like Apprendi, Harris, and Ring, the above-quoted paragraphs from Blakely do not address the
constitutionality of nonstatutory sentencing rules. Instead, the Court merely explained why
Blakely’s statutory maximum was fifty-three months instead of ten years. By statute and the
jury’s verdict, Blakely was convicted of “second-degree kidnaping,” not of “deliberately cruel
kidnaping” or “exceptional kidnaping.” The Court held that a jury’s guilty verdict concerning
second-degree kidnaping — and the facts supporting that conviction — do not authorize the State
to impose a sentence greater than that crime’s fifty-three-month statutory maximum.79 Although
the Court purported to offer an interpretation of the term “statutory maximum,” it seems likely
given Blakely’s facts that the Court was focused on the word “maximum,” whose meaning was
contested in Blakely, rather than the word “statutory,” which was not.

78

124 S. Ct. at 2537 (footnote omitted).

79

Id.
22

The Court’s indisputable holding concerning Blakely’s statutory maximum under
Washington law has been overshadowed by the opinion’s debatable implications for the Federal
Guidelines. Specifically, some district and appellate courts have characterized Blakely’s
definition of “statutory maximum” as equally applicable to the Guidelines’ nonstatutory sentence
enhancements.80 That interpretation isolates two statements from the above paragraphs: “[T]he
relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. . . . Had the
judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he would have been
reversed.”81
To be sure, federal judges (like Washington judges) must explain their sentencing
decisions, and federal enhancements or departures upward from the defendant’s base offense
level often rely on “additional facts” that are not elements of the crime of conviction. Also, if
federal judges (like Washington judges) make any decision that affects a defendant’s sentence
without explaining that decision’s basis, the sentence imposed could be “reversed.”82
However, to grant those similarities controlling weight would misread Blakely’s text and
would also overlook its context. First, as a linguistic matter, the quoted passage from Blakely
purports to define “statutory maximum,” yet the Federal Guidelines, like all other nonstatutory

80

See, e.g., Booker, 375 F.3d at 513; Ameline, 376 F.3d at 967; accord, e.g., United States
v. Medas, 323 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Shamblin, 322 F. Supp. 2d
757, 766 (S.D.W. Va. 2004); United States v. Montgomery, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1270 (D. Utah
2004); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238-39 (D. Utah 2004).
81

124 S. Ct. at 2537.

82

Id.
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sentencing rules, fall outside any plausible meaning of that term. The Guidelines are issued by
the Sentencing Commission, an independent entity in the judicial branch.83 Such Guidelines are
submitted to Congress for approval84 (like various rules of judicial procedure and many
administrative regulations), but they do not comport with constitutional requirements of
Presentment and Signature and thus are not statutes.85 If, as some have suggested, the quoted
language from Blakely effectively declares the Guidelines unconstitutional, why would the Court
repeat the term “statutory maximum”? Is Justice Scalia redefining “statutory” to extend beyond
its traditional, constitutional meaning? Is the term “statutory” a mistake, a vestige, or in Judge
Easterbrook’s terms, “a chuckle at the expense of other[s] . . . who took them seriously and
thought that ‘statutory maximum’ might have something to do with statutes?”86 Undoubtedly,
some jurists argue that the statutory character of a sentencing rule should not be important under
Apprendi.87 But the moment one adopts such a theory is the moment that the term “statutory
maximum” should be discarded, not defined. There is no evidence that Blakely’s majority went
that far.
Second, Blakely explains that a contested sentence enhancement violates Apprendi if it
imposes a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury’s verdict or (an awkward phrase) the
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28 U.S.C. § 991 (“There is established as an independent commission in the judicial
branch of the United States a United States Sentencing Commission.”).
84

28 U.S.C. § 994(q).

85

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The only exception to the rule that Guidelines are not statutes is
the Feeney Amendment, see supra note 46.
86

Booker, 375 F.3d at 518 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).

87

See infra pp. 62-65 (responding to such views).
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facts supporting that verdict.88 Such a rule has no necessary consequence for the Federal
Guidelines. In issuing a guilty verdict, the jury finds that the defendant committed all of a
crime’s elements, and the maximum punishment authorized by the jury’s verdict is the maximum
attached to the crime of conviction. Before Blakely, it was well established that a defendant
convicted of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) was convicted of that statutory offense, and
further that the jury’s verdict constitutionally authorized any sentence up to that crime’s
twenty-year maximum.89 From such a perspective, the Guidelines do not affect the maximum
sentence that a judge may constitutionally impose. They merely limit the conditions under which
a judge may impose specific sentences below that maximum. Accordingly, although the judge
may make “additional findings” that alter a defendant’s sentence, and the sentence may be
“reversed” if those findings are improper or misapplied,90 neither the findings, their effect, nor
the risk of reversal are significant under Apprendi because they do not authorize judges to
“inflict[] punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow,”91 i.e., the statutory maximum
for the crime of conviction.
Does Blakely invite us to rethink these premises, perhaps concluding that federal crimes
of conviction are defined by guideline base offense levels, not statutes? For constitutional

88

“Our precedents make clear . . . [that] the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant. . . . When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential
to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his proper authority.” Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.
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purposes, does Blakely hold that bank robbers are convicted of 18-U.S.C.-§-2113(a)-U.S.S.G.§§-2B3.1(a), with a “statutory maximum” of thirty-one to forty-one months if there is no jury
trial with respect to amount, but of 18-U.S.C.-§-2113(a)-U.S.S.G.-§-2B3.1(b)(7)(C) if $200,000
was stolen? To describe the Guidelines base offense levels as “statutory maxima” would, to say
the least, radically revise the terminology of federal criminal law and would transform current
views of the “maximum” authorized by a federal jury’s verdict.
We will return to the issues raised above, but my present point is only that, contrary to
popular perceptions, Blakely did not consider such questions and certainly did not answer them.
Instead, the Court simply restated Apprendi’s rule that a State may not define a crime (seconddegree kidnaping) with one maximum sentence, yet allow a judge to impose a sentence greater
than that.92 The fact that Washington and New Jersey used markedly different “forms” and
“labels” to describe their statutory maxima did not alter their statutes’ “effect,” which was to
create two separate crimes with two statutory maxima.93 Blakely’s maximum was fifty-three
months, not ten years, just as Apprendi’s maximum was ten years, not twenty, and Ring’s was
life imprisonment, not death. Although the language varies slightly, the two-step logic in each
case is identical, and Blakely did not consider the separate issue of whether nonstatutory
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Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (“[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose
without any additional findings.”).
93

Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 (“[L]abels do not afford an acceptable answer. . . . [T]he
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect — does the required finding expose the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Note that the “effect” at issue is imposing “a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” As shall be discussed, that statement does not deny
that the jury’s “authorization” is itself a formal concept. See infra pp. 53-58.
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sentencing rules should be treated as “statutory maxima.”
Third, it seems especially inapt to read Blakely’s ambiguous language as applying to the
Federal Guidelines because the majority explicitly stated that it “express[ed] no opinion” on that
subject.94 The most defensible view of the Blakely opinion as a whole is, as its terms suggest,
that the Court merely reiterated and applied reasoning that earlier “precedents make clear”
concerning a State’s ability to impose punishment greater than the crime of conviction’s statutory
maximum.95 None of those earlier cases explained — in dicta or by implication — whether the
same principle should govern the nonstatutory Federal Guidelines, and neither did Blakely.
C.

Court-Watching

To be sure, what many observers find interesting about Blakely is not its legal
significance, but its potential value in predicting the Court’s future behavior in Booker, which
will determine the Guidelines’ validity. Blakely not only represents the Court’s most recent
Apprendi analysis, it also was authored by Justice Scalia, whose “swing vote” will decide the
Guidelines’ fate. That said, reading tea leaves is an uncertain business, and upon examination,
Blakely’s signals do not reveal a Court that seems overly eager to invalidate the Guidelines.
With some irony, the strongest evidence that Blakely undermines the Federal Guidelines
is the vehemence of the four dissenting Justices.96 Indeed, Judge Posner cited Blakely’s dissents

94

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9.

95

Id.

96

The “irony” derives from the fact that Blakely’s dissenters would, least of anyone, wish
for Apprendi to invalidate the Guidelines.
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and the majority’s coy response as affirmative evidence of the Guidelines’ legal infirmity.97
Justice O’Connor’s dissent refused to accept the Blakely Court’s explicit statement that it had not
addressed the Guidelines. Writing for herself and three colleagues, Justice O’Connor repeatedly
suggested that the Court’s decision, “whether intended or not,” would spell the Guidelines’
doom.98 In a section that her colleagues did not join, O’Connor’s rhetoric was even more
dramatic: “It is no answer . . . that today’s opinion impacts only Washington’s scheme and not . .
. the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The fact that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
promulgated by . . . the Judicial Branch is irrelevant to the majority’s reasoning. . . . [T]he
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which require an increase in the sentencing range upon specified
factual findings, will meet the same fate.”99 Other dissenting opinions were milder in tone, but
each expressed similar concern for the Federal Guidelines’ post-Blakely future.100
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Booker, 375 F.3d at 511 (““The majority in Blakely, faced with dissenting opinions that
as much as said that the decision doomed the federal sentencing guidelines, might have said, no it
doesn’t; it did not say that.”); id. at 513 (“Justice Scalia, now speaking for a majority of the
Court, in Blakely, though he replied to the dissenting Justices at length, did not say that they were
wrong to suggest that the federal sentencing guidelines could not be distinguished from the
Washington sentencing guidelines.”).
98

Id. at 2543 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The legacy of today’s opinion, whether intended
or not, will be the consolidation of sentencing power in the State and Federal Judiciaries.
(emphasis added)); accord, e.g., id. at 2546 (“Under the majority’s approach, any fact that
increases the upper bound on a judge’s sentencing discretion is an element of the offense.”); id.
at 2548 (“The consequences of today’s decision will be as far reaching as they are disturbing. . . .
Numerous other States have enacted guidelines systems, as has the Federal Government. Today’s
decision casts constitutional doubt over them all . . . . (citations omitted)).
99

124 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

100

Id. at 2251 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, this case concerns the work of a state
legislature, and not of Congress. If anything, however, this distinction counsels even greater
judicial caution.”); id. at 2252 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Until now, I would have thought the
Court might have limited Apprendi so that its underlying principle would not undo sentencing
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Even with strong words, however, four votes do not make a majority. Given the Blakely
Court’s choice not to address the Federal Guidelines (despite Justice O’Connor’s upset), one
might wonder why the dissents matter much. After all, the dissenters in Blakely are the same
jurists who disagreed with Apprendi in the first place, and who at that time predicted that
mandatory minima and determinate sentencing would soon be invalid.101 Despite their vantage
point, such Justices’ views may warrant as much skepticism as authority, especially because
Blakely’s dissents largely reiterate their earlier arguments that Apprendi rendered the Guidelines
unconstitutional.102 In Apprendi, as in Blakely, a majority of the Court explicitly refused to
address the Guidelines,103 and the Apprendi Court drily described the dissents as “treat[ing] us to
a lengthy disquisition on the benefits of determinate sentencing schemes, and the effect of
[Apprendi] on the federal Sentencing Guidelines.”104 Given the Court’s quick response to the
dissenters’ concerns five years ago in Apprendi, it is predictable that the Court would be similarly
brief when those same arguments were rehearsed in Blakely.
Another reason that Blakely’s dissenters might misperceive the scope of that ruling is

reform efforts. Today’s case dispels that illusion. . . . Perhaps the Court will distinguish the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but I am uncertain how.”).
101

See supra notes 10-22.
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Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (“[I]n light of the adoption of determinatesentencing schemes by many States and the Federal Government, the consequences of the
Court’s . . . rules in terms of sentencing schemes invalidated by today’s decision will likely be
severe.”), and id. at 551-52, with id. at supra note 24 (collecting cases upholding the Guidelines
after Apprendi).
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Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21.
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21.
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that, as we shall soon see, the deciding vote in the pending guideline cases is Blakely’s author,
Justice Scalia. Few would rely too heavily on a Scalian dissent to predict the future scope of a
majority opinion by Justice O’Connor. In many respects, no two Justices are more different. To
hazard guesses regarding the Rehnquist Court’s future behavior (if one must), it is often
important to identify the fifth “swing vote” and analyze the issues with an eye toward that
Justice’s perspective. The only difference here is the Justice in question.
The Apprendi/Blakely majority — Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg — do not typically vote together in close cases, and it has already become clear that
they do not agree on the nature and scope of Apprendi. In fact, United States v. Harris illustrates
that the fifth, narrowest vote is Justice Scalia’s.105 In Harris, the Court considered whether
Apprendi should apply to mandatory minima, and thus whether McMillan v. Pennsylvania should
be overruled.106 Although Justice Stevens’s Apprendi opinion reserved that question, his
vigorous dissent in McMillan suggested that he would vote to strike down mandatory minima.107
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which the majority cited favorably, likewise described a
jury right whose adverse “consequence . . . [for] McMillan should be plain enough.”108 None in
the Apprendi majority disputed the merits of Justice Thomas’s concurrence, and Justice Scalia

105

536 U.S. at 545.
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477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95-103 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
accord Jones, 526 U.S. at 253 (“[I]n my view, a proper understanding of this principle
encompasses facts that increase the minimum as well as the maximum permissible sentence
. . . .”). Indeed, it seems at least possible that Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in Apprendi
suppressed his personal views in order to hold a fifth vote for the majority.
108

530 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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joined its analysis in large part, though not its discussion of McMillan.109
Ultimately, however, the fifth vote in Harris for preserving McMillan and mandatory
minima was Justice Scalia, who forced the rest of Apprendi’s majority into dissent. Justice
Thomas noted without satisfaction that only a plurality of the Court would admit that Apprendi
and Harris were even reconcilable.110 But even though Justice Scalia may be the only one who
thinks that both Apprendi and Harris were rightly decided, his is the only vote that matters.
As I shall discuss, the result in Harris is crucial to understanding the theory underlying
the Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence.111 But even at a descriptive level, Harris may help to
explain why Blakely reads as it does. The Justice who assigned the Court’s opinion in Blakely
was the majority’s most senior member, Justice Stevens. In controversial cases, where the result
depends on an unstable majority, opinions are often assigned to the Justice whose views are most
narrow or most uncertain, thereby reducing any risk that the majority could splinter in reasoning
or result.112 Justice Scalia’s authorship of Blakely fits that pattern. The lack of concurring
opinions in Blakely might indicate a consensus among the majority that the case needed nothing
beyond Justice Scalia’s simple explanation. Or the five may have said nothing about the
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Id. at 498, 519-524.
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536 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment but
not the entire opinion of the Court . . . . This leaves only a minority of the Court embracing the
distinction between McMillan and Apprendi that forms the basis of today's holding, and at least
one Member explicitly continues to reject both Apprendi and Jones.” (citations omitted)).
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See infra pp. 45-52.
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Such assignments also mitigate the risk that a dissenter might persuade a “swing voter”
to switch sides, on the theory that judges are often most loyal to opinions that they themselves
have written.
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Guidelines because, as a five-vote majority, there was nothing on which all five could agree.
Thanks in part to the United States’ amicus brief, the Court in Blakely knew that its
decision could easily be written to resolve the Federal Guidelines’ constitutional status. Yet the
Court did not do so. Furthermore, if the Court had wished last year, or any other year after
Apprendi, to decide the Guidelines’ constitutionality, there was an abundant pool of federal
defendants seeking certiorari on that issue. Despite the lack of a circuit split,113 would the Court
allow tens of thousands of federal sentences to be imposed, year after year, under conditions that
they viewed as deeply unconstitutional? Could judges who care so much for the jury right care
so little about a continuous practice of unconstitutional sentencing? Even more directly, why
would the Court not take a federal “companion case” if Blakely’s issues indeed disposed of the
Guidelines’ status?114 Such questions may not command clear answers. But they do illustrate
that the only solid conclusion to be drawn from Blakely’s context is the same message within its
ambiguous text: For reasons known only to the Court, the majority deliberately opted to resolve
Blakely without explicitly or implicitly determining the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’
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See generally SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (listing conflict among federal appellate courts as a
factor that, “although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate[s]
the character of the reasons the Court considers”).
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Blakely’s procedural details confirm that the Court had a significant opportunity to
select a companion case. Blakely’s petition for certiorari was discussed at three of the Court’s
conferences (September 29, October 10, and October 17, 2003); the merits briefs of Washington
and the United States were filed on January 23, 2004; argument was heard on March 23, 2004;
and the Court’s opinion did not issue until June 24, 2004. See Supreme Court Docket, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/02-1632.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004). Even if the
Court somehow underestimated Blakely’s potential relevance to the Federal Guidelines when
certiorari was granted, there were several months when that potential relevance was quite clear.
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constitutionality.115 For federal sentencing, Blakely was not a legal “earthquake”;116 it was at
most a preliminary tremor.
II.

Apprendi’s Principle
Thus far, I have set forth an unconventional interpretation of Blakely, arguing that the

case neither decides nor implies a decision regarding the dispositive legal issues that surround the
Federal Guidelines. This Part will look deeper into the Court’s pre-Blakely jurisprudence. In
order to determine whether Apprendi requires indictment and jury trial for factors that increase a
sentence above a nonstatutory baseline, one must understand the theoretical basis for Apprendi’s
rule in the first place. Justice Scalia and other members of the Court have divided and even
oscillated in describing the fundamental character of Apprendi rights. Thus, before further
exploring my own view, which depends on the legislative definition of a crime of conviction, I
will consider two competing theories and explain why they are unconvincing.
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There are jurists, including Justices O’Connor and Breyer, who might criticize the
Court for invalidating Blakely’s state sentence without addressing the important questions that
arise under the federal system. See O’Connor Disgusted, supra note 34;Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at
2561 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]this case affects tens of thousands of criminal prosecutions,
including federal prosecutions. . . . Given this consequence and the need for certainty, I would
not proceed further piecemeal; rather, I would call for further argument on the ramifications of
the concerns I have raised. But that is not the Court’s view.”)
Such criticism must shift its focus if Blakely’s silence derived from a need to ease
frictions among the five-Justice majority. Although much is made of the federal system’s current
“chaos,” that chaos might have been worse if the Court had considered the Federal Guidelines’
constitutionality, thereby aggravating individual Justices’ differences into concurring opinions
with responses, and perhaps failing to produce a majority opinion altogether.
116

16 Fed. Sent. Rep. tit. (entitling the volume “The Blakely Earthquake”).
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A.

A Model Of Substantive Rights
What might be called a “substantive interpretation” of Apprendi would insist that the jury

play a principal role in determining the actual amount of punishment a defendant receives.
Although no jurist has explicitly endorsed such a strong vision of Apprendi rights, it is the most
intuitively appealing characterization of Apprendi because it alone focuses on effects that matter
to defendants in the real world. For a substantive interpretation, different definitions of crimes
are not abstractions; they are inextricably connected to levels of actual punishment: “Why, after
all, would anyone care if they were convicted of murder, as opposed to manslaughter, but for the
increased penalties for the former offense, which in turn reflect the greater moral opprobrium
society attaches to the act?”117 From such a vantage point, the fundamental principle of criminal
law is a “necessary link between punishment and crime,”118 i.e., a proportionality between factual
elements of guilt and the increments of penalty imposed.
A substantive interpretation of Apprendi would require that, if the jury is constitutionally
responsible for determining guilt, that finding must have a clear, operative connection to the
actual punishment that a defendant receives. Arguably, without that firm relationship to actual
sentencing, the jury’s verdict would fade in importance and would decide “guilt” in name only.119
Moreover, an intimate link between verdict and punishment protects the defendant’s interests in
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Harris, 536 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Id.

119

Cf. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 (“If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life on a
nonjury determination, the jury’s role would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually
carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping: in some
cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year sentence would merely open the
door to a judicial finding sufficient for life imprisonment.”).
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notice, because the factual elements to be found by the jury must also appear in the indictment.
In its purest form, a substantive interpretation would find a violation of Apprendi wherever the
jury’s verdict rests on one set of facts, but the defendant’s sentence is based, in any operative
part, on different facts found by a judge. Such a regime would require the face of the indictment
and the crime of conviction to inform a defendant of every allegation that will be used to
determine the “kind, degree, or range of punishment”120 imposed after conviction. The
substantive interpretation would thus invalidate the Federal Guidelines because many
defendants’ sentences are affected by a judge’s independent, post-conviction determinations.
Despite its simplicity and attention to “real-world” consequences, the substantive
interpretation lacks support among judges or scholars because it leaves insufficient space for this
country’s history of judicial factfinding. Under indeterminate sentencing, which was the
hallmark of United States criminal law for most of its history, crimes of convictions could and
often did entail broad statutory ranges of punishment.121 At sentencing, judges would consider
numerous facts other than the crime of conviction’s elements, including socially valuable
projects, apparent malice, projected recidivism, penitence, prior criminal acts, and much else.122
Each or all of those facts could form indispensable, legally authorized components of a judge’s
decision to impose an increased sentence, and none of them had any clear or necessary
relationship to the jury’s verdict.
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 1247, 1248 (1997).
122

Id. at 1248-49.
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Indeterminate sentencing’s pedigree rebuts any assertion that the Constitution requires a
detailed, active role for juries in sentencing. For example, there is no question that the
Constitution allows defendants to be convicted of a crime with a broad statutory range, and the
Constitution allows judges to impose any sentence in that range based on a preponderance of
evidence regarding facts that are not elements of the offense. That is so even if a judge details
the factual findings supporting the sentence, even if there is a “routine” sentence that the judge
imposes in the absence of “additional evidence” at sentencing, and even if all judges in the
jurisdiction choose, in their individual discretion, to employ the same baseline sentence and the
same grounds for imposing a larger sentence.
Imagine a hypothetical bank robber who pleads guilty to an offense with a statutory
sentence of five years to life. To support the plea bargain, the prosecution proves only, as the
hypothetical statute requires, that the defendant removed money by force from a bank. At
sentencing, however, the prosecution introduces evidence that the defendant used a machine gun,
took hostages, tried to kill a security guard, and had previously committed several similar
robberies.123 Imagine a sentencing judge who, in a detailed opinion, explains that five to seven
years would be appropriate in a “garden variety” bank robbery, but this crime’s seriousness
deserved more. The judge further calculates that any robbery involving a hostage warrants at
least fifteen years, any attempted machine gunning earns an additional ten years, and a criminal
history like the defendant’s merits six years more. Our hypothetical defendant is thus sentenced
123

To complete the scenario, one could also imagine evidence that the defendant was a
now-recovered drug abuser, who was a decorated military veteran of the First Iraq War, and was
so genuinely repentant of her crime that she had become a strong participant and role model in
anti-drug and anti-crime organizations. To incorporate such mitigating facts would not alter any
of the text’s conclusions.
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to thirty-eight years’ imprisonment — thirty-one years above what the judge would have imposed
without her “additional findings” — based largely on facts that were not presented in the
indictment, found by a jury, or proved beyond reasonable doubt. Yet there is no Apprendi
problem in sight.124
The fact that such an indeterminate sentencing system is not only permissible, but
incontestably permissible, tempers the norms typically offered to support Apprendi’s rule. For
example, although it is commonplace that juries must find “every fact that is legally essential to
the punishment [imposed],”125 that statement means less than it seems. From a defendant’s
perspective, the phrase “legally essential” imposes serious limits on Apprendi’s significance.126
Defendants wish to know the sentence that they will receive if convicted. Their interest in
knowing a hypothetical sentence that they “might” receive is derivative, regardless of whether it
is phrased as a “maximum,” a “minimum,” or a “range.” To be concrete, notice of a statutory
maximum is nearly worthless if all sentences are imposed far below that maximum, and notice of
a minimum is likewise empty if all actual sentences lie well above it. Indeed, knowledge of
one’s “range” of punishment is practically useful only if that range is very small, or if one knows
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Cf. Harris, 536 U.S. at 560 (plurality) (“It does not matter, for the purposes of the
constitutional analysis, that . . . the State provides that a fact shall give rise both to a special
stigma and to a special punishment. Judges choosing a sentence within the range do the same,
and ‘[j]udges, it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves, are part of the State.’ Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 & n.5 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769), and 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50-56 (2d ed. 1872));
accord Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-83, 489-90 & n.15.
126

Cf. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248 (“It is not, of course, that anyone today would claim that
every fact with a bearing on sentence must be found by a jury; we have resolved that general
issue and have no intention of questioning its resolution.”).
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the distribution of sentences within the range. Under indeterminate sentencing, for crimes with a
broad statutory range, there is a tangible sense that a defendant’s conviction is only a preliminary
step toward the sentencing phase, where practical decisions are made regarding the defendant’s
actual sentence. Thus, although the defendant’s interest in avoiding significant judicial sentence
enhancements may support Apprendi rights, it is not a value that helps to define those rights.
B.

A Model Of Judicial Discretion
Another constitutional theory that would invalidate the Federal Guidelines was espoused

by Justice Thomas in his Apprendi concurrence (which Justice Scalia joined in part)127 and his
Harris dissent (which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined).128 Although Justice
Thomas at times refers to substantive consequences, it is clear on reflection that his theory
accounts for indeterminate sentencing only by moving away from the practical consequences that
matter most to criminal defendants. In taking that step, Justice Thomas’s model centers on the
“range of available punishment,” i.e., the scope of available judicial discretion.
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Apprendi, 503 U.S. 499-524 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Harris, 536 U.S. at 572-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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1. Apprendi’s Concurrence129
Justice Thomas described the fundamental question in Apprendi as “what constitutes a
‘crime.’”130 In turn, he defined “crime” by reference to “elements,” which include “every fact
that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment . . . . One need only look to the
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As a brief note on methodology, Justice Thomas’s Apprendi opinion relies heavily on
historical materials that were not compiled in any brief or modern scholarship. That history is
not analyzed in detail here, because it provides neither a theoretical account of Apprendi rights,
nor direct answers concerning the Guidelines’ constitutionality. Nonetheless, one should
mention that Justice Thomas’s overall characterization of the record is overstated: “A long line
of essentially uniform authority . . . stretching from the earliest reported cases after the founding
until well into the 20th century, establishes that the original understanding of which facts are
elements was even broader than the rule [regarding statutory maxima] that the Court adopts
today.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Harris, the Solicitor General
indicated several flaws in Justice Thomas’s analysis concerning mandatory minima,
Respondent’s Brief at 32-36, Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 524 (2002) (No. 00-10666), and
Justice Thomas did not respond to those criticisms or reassert his argument’s historical merit.
E.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“According to the plurality, the historical
practices underlying [Apprendi] . . . do not support extension . . . to facts that increase a
defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence. Such fine distinctions with regard to vital
constitutional liberties cannot withstand scrutiny.”); id. at 580 (“Looking to the principles that
animated the decision in Apprendi and the bases for the historical practice upon which Apprendi
rested (rather than to the historical pedigree of mandatory minimums), there are no logical
grounds for treating facts triggering mandatory minimums any differently than facts that increase
the statutory maximum.” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, Justice Thomas’s reliance on statements from late-nineteenth century treatises,
which did not identify federal constitutional differences between jury-bound elements and
judicial sentence enhancements, fails as evidence that would “confirm[]” founding-era
understandings. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 510-512 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 1 J. BISHOP,
LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50 (2d ed. 1870), 1 J. BISHOP NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 49 (4th
ed. 1895), 1 J. BISHOP COMMENTARIES ON CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 1872)); 1 J. BISHOP, LAW OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 54 (stating, without explanation, that judicial consideration of aggravating
factors to increase a defendant’s sentence “is an entirely different thing from punishing one for
what is not alleged against him”). Even if the Constitution did incorporate “established
principles” of common-law history, Justice Thomas’s relevant common-law authorities all arise
decades after the Bill of Rights’ ratification.
130

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring); Harris, 536 U.S. at 575 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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kind, degree, or range of punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a given set of
facts. Each fact necessary for that entitlement is an element.”131 Justice Thomas’s definition of
“element” uses two phrases to describe the same basic idea. Under the primary iteration, Justice
Thomas would apply Apprendi to any fact that is “by law” a “basis for . . . increasing
punishment.” As suggested above, the term “by law” has a special meaning in this context.132
Justice Thomas would not invalidate any sort of indeterminate sentencing, even though such
systems would otherwise seem to qualify as imposing and increasing sentences “by law.”133
Instead, Justice Thomas characterizes Apprendi as providing a limited right against determinate
sentencing enhancements, that is, against provisions that attach punishment to facts by rule, not
as a matter of unchanneled judicial discretion. The Federal Guidelines would presumably be
invalid under Justice Thomas’s rule because the effect of statutory and nonstatutory rules on
judges’ discretion is the same, and several on the Court have described the Guidelines as “having
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring); accord, e.g., id. at 502 (“[A] fact
that is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment is an element.”); id. at 506 (“[I]f a
statute increased the punishment of a common-law crime . . . based on some fact, then that fact
must be charged in the indictment in order for the court to impose the increased punishment.”);
id. at 508 (noting that a “fact is an element because it increases the punishment by law”); id. at
510 (“[T]he indictment must . . . contain an averment of every particular thing which enters into
the punishment.” (quoting 1 J. Bishop, LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50 (2d ed. 1892))); id. at
515 (“[A] crime includes any fact to which punishment attaches.”); id. at 521 (“If a fact is by law
the basis for imposing or increasing punishment — for establishing or increasing the
prosecution’s entitlement — it is an element.”).
132

See supra p. 37.
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Thus, Justice Thomas differentiates between Apprendi’s rule concerning “what the
Constitution requires the prosecution to do in order to entitle itself to a particular kind, degree, or
range of punishment,” and “constitutional constraints [that] apply . . . to the imposition of
punishment within the limits of that entitlement.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
40

the force and effect of law.”134
Justice Thomas’s focus on “increasing” punishment “by law” raises important theoretical
issues. First, as a normative matter, it is not clear why the Constitution should provide greater
procedural protections to defendants subject to rule-based sentencing than to those subject to
discretion-based sentencing. Imagine two judges, one applying indeterminate sentencing and the
other using the Guidelines. They might impose the same sentence on defendants convicted of the
same statutory crime, relying on the same factual findings, using the same post-conviction
evidence, to prove the same uncharged conduct, and applying the same evidentiary standards.
Why should the Constitution treat them differently? Is it because indeterminate sentencing better
comports with “due process” or rights to a “jury trial”? Justice Thomas has never directly
confronted such questions, but it is hard to see any inherent danger in punishment “by law” —
i.e., by rule — that would merit special safeguards under Apprendi.
A second problem is to determine, in Justice Thomas’s view, what types of sentencing
“rules” might violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. For example, does a rule’s impermissible
status turn on its content, or maybe its origin? Imagine the following scenarios for a bank robber
whose statutory sentencing range is five years to life: (1) The individual judge imposes a
sentence of thirty-eight years. (2) The judge explains that her “normal” sentence for bank
robbery is five to seven years, but this defendant’s violent and dangerous conduct deserves
134

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); accord United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148, 160 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (providing that a district
court “shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in [the Guidelines]
unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines”).
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thirty-eight years. (3) The judge explains that, in her court, she always imposes fifteen years
above “normal” for crimes with hostages, ten years for crimes with attempted machine gunning,
and six years for defendants with multiple prior offenses; thus, this defendant receives
thirty-eight years. (4) The judge imposes a thirty-eight-year sentence, explaining that every
court in the jurisdiction, including hers, follows the above system, with narrowly defined
exceptions for extraordinary circumstances. (5) The system of rules is promulgated by a group
of judges, who enforce it upon one another through ordinary appellate channels. (6) A
congressionally-organized Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch issues the rules.
Option (1) is clearly valid under ordinary indeterminate sentencing principles, but beyond
that, it is hard to see where any relevant line should be drawn. If Justice Thomas’s “right” is one
granting purely individualized sentencing, (2) or (3) might be invalid. If the right protects
individual judges’ discretion, aggregation under (4) or (5) might be problematic. If judges are
allowed “voluntarily” to surrender their discretion, constitutional problems might emerge only
when Congress creates an entity to structure judicial discretion, as under (6). There may be
plausible policy arguments in favor of each of these lines, but such incidents of organization and
operation seem distant from any core concern of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
Third, Justice Thomas’s theory must explain what type of enforcement mechanism might
give a “sentencing rule” its impermissibly mandatory character. One possibility would be to look
at legislative labels, such that the Federal Guidelines would could be valid if they were literally
rephrased as “persuasive authority” but were otherwise kept the same. Another possibility would
be to focus on appellate review, holding invalid any regime where, as a practical matter, the
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sentencing judge could be reversed for imposing a sentence outside the “rules.”135 But what if
Congress retained the Guidelines’ formally mandatory tone and repealed only its provision for
appellate review,136 such that the Guidelines lacked any enforcement mechanism other than the
sentencing judge’s oath and lawful conscience? Perhaps Justice Thomas would look to informal
coercion as a possible source of “rules.” Examples include a system where adherence to
hortatory Guidelines becomes a litmus test at confirmation, and decisions that do not follow such
Guidelines are reported to Congress for criticism.137 Similarly, Congress might require detailed
explanations, upon risk of reversal, as justification for any departure from such “persuasive”
Guidelines. Such political and bureaucratic coercion could conceivably mimic the force of
substantive appellate review. Finally, Justice Thomas might determine whether something is a
binding “rule” by looking directly to its practical effects. Under that approach, it might matter if
every judge in fact follows the Guidelines, regardless of how the rules are phrased or formally
enforced.
One cannot know whether any or all of the above factors would be relevant in
determining whether a rule has impermissibly restricted judicial discretion. But it is at least
certain that, if Justice Thomas’s theory were given authoritative force, future cases might render
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This view that “reversal” might be constitutionally critical might also seek support in
Blakely’s definition of a “statutory maximum,” 124 S. Ct. at 2537, which is discussed above,
see supra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
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See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (“Review of a Sentence”).
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Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 476 (requiring a semiannual report to Congress of certain delayed
matters on each judge’s docket).
43

his vision’s practical details almost as difficult to identify as its normative basis.138
A fourth problem with Justice Thomas’s prohibition against any rule-bound “increas[e]”
in punishment is his failure to explain how such “increases” relate to the jury’s verdict. Every
increase must be an increase “over” some baseline, and the constitutionally prescribed baseline
under Apprendi is the sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict.139 Although Justice Thomas
seems to assume that any rule-bound fact to cause punishment above the judicially “normal”
sentence is an “increased sentence,” that assumption is at least controversial and undefended.140
Because Justice Thomas does not indicate how to determine what sentence a jury’s verdict
authorizes, nor why the jury’s authorization should turn on a sentencing judge’s range of
discretion, his standard for “increasing punishment” lacks a necessary component.
An alternate phrasing within Justice Thomas’s definition of “elements” would attach
constitutional safeguards to any fact that increases the punishment to which “the prosecution is
by law entitled for a given set of facts.”141 Those words seem unhelpful, however, because

138

A slightly different possibility would be to interpret Justice Thomas’s phrase “by law”
not as a standard against rules, but only against rules of specified content. One might then argue
that aggravators in an indeterminate system are not a basis for increasing a sentence “by law,”
because the judge is allowed to choose which types of conduct warrant any additional
punishment. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring). Blakely’s lesson is otherwise.
There, the Court easily and correctly held that a legislature cannot escape Apprendi’s rule by
failing to specify which particular facts authority a sentence above the statutory maximum:
“Whether the judge’s authority to impose an enhanced sentence depends on finding a specific
fact (as in Apprendi), one of several facts (as in Ring), or any aggravating fact (as here), it
remains the case that the jury’s verdict does not authorize the sentence.” 124 S. Ct. at 2538.
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See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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For a different interpretation, that the jury’s verdict authorizes the statutory maximum,
see infra pp. 53-58.
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas does not explain what prosecutorial “entitlement” might mean. For example,
how could the prosecution be “entitled” to any level of punishment other than the sentence that a
particular defendant “deserves,” i.e., the sentence that the judge actually imposes in an individual
case? Again, the United States’ history of indeterminate sentencing dictates that judges, not just
juries, may determine particular sentences in particular cases, and Justice Thomas accepts that
practice as valid.142 Thus, the prosecution’s “entitlement” must refer not to the actual amount of
punishment that a defendant receives, but to the permissible “range of punishment” available as a
matter of judicial discretion. Accordingly, under both iterations, Justice Thomas’s definition of
“elements” implicitly characterizes Apprendi rights as incorporating a fundamental opposition to
sentencing rules and a corresponding preference for judicial discretion. As discussed above, that
opposition and preference lack any apparent basis in constitutional principle or practical
reason.143
2. Harris’s Dissent
Although Justice Thomas’s theory concerning the significance of a “range of
punishment” first appeared in Part III of his Apprendi concurrence, which no other Justice joined,
important features of that theory were clarified by his discussion of mandatory minima in
Harris.144 Justice Thomas’s Harris dissent also merits attention because, joined by Justices
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See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
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See supra p. 40.
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Incidentally, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Apprendi’s precursor, Jones v.
United States , also seemed to endorse a range-based analysis: “[I]t is unconstitutional to remove
from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of penalties
to which a criminal defendant is exposed.” 526 U.S. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, it may best articulate the views of those Justices who might vote
to invalidate the Guidelines.
Mandatory minima posed a difficult, and ultimately divisive, issue for Apprendi’s
majority. On one hand, mandatory minima’s practical effects on defendants argued against their
constitutionality. For many crimes, to change the statutory minimum yields a much higher
sentence than would a changed maximum. Also, an altered minimum affects defendants in the
lowest and least culpable range of offenders, who might inspire sympathy, while maxima matter
only for the most culpable defendants, who are judged to deserve extraordinary sentences. If
Apprendi stood for the proposition that juries should find all important factual components of a
defendant’s sentence, modern minima would often qualify. However, Apprendi cannot require
all “important” facts to be found by the jury without invalidating indeterminate sentencing, under
which judicial findings matter a great deal.145 Indeed, where a statutory range is broad, the
sentencing judge’s factual findings and judgments are often the most important component of the
defendant’s sentence. Such findings are indisputably valid, even though their factual bases may
not be alleged in an indictment or proved to a jury.146
On the other hand, aspects of Apprendi’s logic recommended upholding mandatory
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See supra pages 35-36; cf. Harris, 536 U.S. at 549 (“After the accused is convicted, the
judge may impose a sentence within a range provided by statute, basing it on various facts
relating to the defendant and the manner in which the offense was committed. Though these
facts may have a substantial impact on the sentence, they are not elements, and are thus not
subject to the Constitution’s indictment, jury, and proof requirements.”).
146

Harris, 536 U.S. at 562 (“Judges . . . have always considered uncharged ‘aggravating
circumstances’ that, while increasing the defendant’s punishment, have not ‘swell[ed] the penalty
above what the law has provided for the acts charged.’ (quoting Bishop, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
54)).
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minima. The basic problem with sentencing above the statutory maximum is that the defendant
receives a punishment above what the jury authorized. Thus, a defendant who wrongly receives
a super-maximal punishment is, without more, entitled to a lesser sentence. Not so with statutory
minima. A defendant facing an altered minimum could have received the same sentence
regardless of a raised minimum. For a bank robber whose statutory sentencing range is five years
to life, if the judge applies a seven-year mandatory minimum for discharging a firearm and
imposes a sentence of seven years, that same punishment could have been imposed without the
mandatory minimum. For a bank robber who receives twelve years, it also may be irrelevant
whether the minimum was five years or seven. Indeed, whenever a defendant’s sentence is
reversed because of a judicial mandatory minimum, the defendant could have received exactly
the same sentence without further action by the jury. To be clear, this is not because Apprendi
claims concerning mandatory minima are “harmless,”147 and the argument does not depend on
what the judge would have done absent the raised minimum. Rather, the fact that the sentence
could have been the same illustrates that the defendant’s punishment was in any event authorized
by the jury’s conviction. From that viewpoint, there is no Apprendi problem at all.
The Harris Court held that mandatory minima are constitutional and noted that, “[s]ince
sentencing ranges came into use, defendants have not been able to predict from the face of the
indictment precisely what their sentence will be; the charged facts have simply made them aware
of the ‘heaviest punishment’ they face if convicted.”148 In dissent, Justice Thomas (joined by
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See generally FED. R. CR. P. 52(a) (“Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).
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Harris, 536 U.S. at 562 (plurality) (quoting Bishop, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 54); see id.
at 557 (plurality) (“Apprendi said that any fact extending the defendant’s sentence beyond the
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Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg) advanced a position similar to his Apprendi concurrence. Without
casting doubt on “judicial discretion to impose ‘judgment within the range prescribed by
statute,’” Justice Thomas insisted that a criminal does have a “constitutional right to know . . .
the circumstances that will determine the applicable range of punishment and to have those
circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”149 Even though it is true that defendants
could receive the same punishment regardless of a changed minimum,150 Justice Thomas
proclaimed that “[w]hether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that
the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed,” because any
change in the minimum sentence necessarily “constitut[es] an increased penalty.”151
From a practical viewpoint, the terms of Justice Thomas’s argument are illogical. To
raise the “floor” of a defendant’s minimum sentence does not necessarily cause greater
punishment, because the defendant’s actual sentence might been equal to or greater than the

maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict would have been considered an element of an
aggravated crime . . . by those who framed the Bill of Rights. The same cannot be said of a fact
increasing the mandatory minimum . . . for the jury’s verdict has already authorized the judge to
impose [that sentence] with or without the [additional] finding.”).
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Harris, 536 U.S. at 575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 579-80 (Thomas J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also flirted briefly (as he did in
Apprendi itself) with a substantive vision of Apprendi, objecting that, “under the decision today,
. . . key facts actually responsible for fixing a defendant’s punishment need not be charged in an
indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that “the defendant [under Harris] cannot
predict the judgment from the face of the felony.” Id. at 578-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). As we have seen, such objections are by their terms inconsistent with
indeterminate sentencing, which has exactly those results. See infra pages 35-36.
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elevated minimum in any event.152 The intuition that a defendant is made “worse off” by an
increased minimum assumes — and is valid proportionate to — the probability that the defendant
would otherwise receive a sentence below that increased minimum. To take an easy example, if
a defendant’s sentence were determined by a random number generator, an increased minimum
sentence would increase the average expected sentence. Individuals’ sentences are not random,
however. Some defendants may have a realistic chance of receiving a minimal or near-minimal
sentence, depending on, inter alia, prosecutorial selectivity, conviction rates, criminal statutes,
and the method of calculating punishment. On the contrary, defendants who commit extremely
serious offenses may have no realistic chance of receiving a near-minimum sentence. It is thus
case-dependent whether an increased statutory minimum will make any particular defendant
“worse off,” and if so, by how much.153
Justice Thomas’s analysis becomes more sensible if one assumes that he is focused, not
on a defendant’s actual punishment, which the mandatory minimum may not affect, but on the
hypothetically available range of sentences. As we have seen, that difference matters as a general
theoretical matter,154 but it takes on special practical importance in the context of mandatory
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That is perhaps why Justice Thomas provides empirical analysis of actual sentences
imposed under the federal statute at issue in Harris, 536 U.S. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Despite that contingent factual analysis, it seems clear that Justice Thomas’s reasoning rests
primarily on principles that are independent of the actual distribution of sentences in practice.
Cf. id. at 579 (“[O]ur fundamental constitutional principles cannot alter depending on degrees of
sentencing severity.”).
153

To repeat for clarity, none of this is to deny that, in the current federal system,
mandatory minima make an enormous difference in the sentences of a substantial number of
defendants, especially including those who occupy the lower end of the applicable statutory
sentencing range.
154

See supra notes 124-25.
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minima. In Apprendi and Ring, the constitutional right at stake was one against unduly harsh
sentences and unjustified deprivations of life or liberty. That was not the issue in Harris,
however, because the defendant could have received the same sentence even without the
increased minimum. Justice Thomas was thus forced to characterize all Apprendi jurisprudence
as concerning, not increased sentences, but effects on the range of sentencing, regardless of
whether the increase affected “floor” or “ceiling,” and regardless of whether the defendant’s
actual sentence would actually change. Justice Thomas asserted a legal parallel between
allowing judicial discretion to sentence above the statutory maximum and stripping judicial
discretion by raising the statutory minimum. That parallel would bar a sentencing judge from
imposing any statutory rule that limits the judge’s discretion to sentence within the otherwise
applicable range. If a bank robber’s statutory sentence were five-to-life, and the sentencing judge
applied a seven-year minimum because a firearm was discharged, Justice Thomas’s logic would
find a constitutional violation (albeit a harmless one) even if the judge explicitly indicated that
she would have imposed seven years’ imprisonment regardless of the minimum.
Although Justice Thomas’s interpretation of Apprendi rights had not been considered in
the Court’s prior cases, that interpretation was squarely rejected in Harris. Because Justice
Scalia, as Harris’s fifth vote, did not write, one must look to Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion,
which Scalia joined in full.155 The plurality’s critical step was to distinguish between the
sentence imposed by the judge and the maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict. “When a
155

The plurality’s opinion on these points did not draw five votes because Justice Breyer
refused to agree that Apprendi and Harris could be reconciled. Harris, 536 U.S. at 569-572
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Because Justice Breyer’s vote to
uphold the Guidelines is beyond doubt, his disagreement with plurality’s doctrinal analysis is not
material for present purposes, and it does not affect the operative authority of Harris’s reasoning.
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judge sentences the defendant to a mandatory minimum, no less than when the judge chooses a
sentence within the [sentencing] range, the grand and petit juries already have found all the facts
necessarily to authorize . . . the sentence.”156 In such contexts, “additional” judicial factfinding
— on whatever standard of proof — is irrelevant. “The judge may impose the minimum, the
maximum, or any other sentence within the range without seeking further authorization from
those juries — and without contradicting Apprendi.”157 The plurality quoted Justice Scalia’s
Apprendi concurrence: “[B]ecause . . . the judge’s choice of sentences within the authorized
range may be influenced by facts not considered by the jury, a factual finding’s practical effect
cannot by itself control the constitutional analysis. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that
the defendant ‘will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime,’ but
they do not promise that he will receive ‘anything less’ than that.”158 “Within the range
authorized by the jury’s verdict . . . the political system may channel judicial discretion . . . by
requiring defendants to serve minimum terms after judges make certain factual findings.”159
If the Guidelines’ constitutional status were to be decided by the dissenters in Harris, the
result would be clear. Although the Guidelines are rules of the Sentencing Commission, not
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Harris, 536 U.S. at 565 (plurality).
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Id.
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Id. at 566 (plurality) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring)); see
also id. (“The judge may select any sentence within the range, based on facts not alleged in the
indictment or proved to the jury — even if those facts are specified by the legislature, and even if
they persuade the judge to choose a much higher sentence than he or she otherwise would have
imposed. That a fact affects the defendant’s sentence, even dramatically so, does not by itself
make it an element.”).
159

Id. at 567 (plurality).
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Congress, they certainly limit sentencing judges’ discretion. Indeed, as Washington argued in
Blakely, judges often had more discretion under the State’s statutory system than would be
provided by the Federal Guidelines in similar circumstances.160 But in Harris, where the
judicial-discretion model would have had a clear impact, Justice Thomas could not attract a fifth
vote. Whether that failure was due to his position’s theoretical problems, or to difficulties in
drawing distinctions,161 it suggests that the judicial-discretion model may not represent a
sustainable theory of Apprendi rights.
On the other hand, if the Harris dissenters do prevail in Booker, they will need to develop
a plausible normative basis for their judicial-discretion model, and they will confront two
doctrinal options in future cases. First, they could adopt a theory focused on a sentencing judge’s
formal discretion. Such a model would find no constitutional violation so long as a judge
remains theoretically autonomous. It would not matter whether some or all sentences in fact
follow collectively promulgated rules, so long as those rules are enforced by some mechanism
other than direct appellate review.
Second, the Harris dissenters might choose a robust vision of judicial discretion. That
theoretical model, however, might require searching inquiry into whether a particular sentencing
judge is imposing her own, individualized assessment of a defendant’s punishment, rather than
some collective assessment that is directly “imposed” by others. At present, one cannot know
what sort of “rules” Justice Thomas would strike down and, by implication, what sort of
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Respondent’s Brief at 24-26, 34, Blakely (No. 02-1632); cf. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 254950 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If anything, the structural differences that do exist make the
Federal Guidelines more vulnerable to attack [than Washington’s scheme].”).
161

See supra pp.41-45.
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“discretion” he would protect. But it seems likely that any answers to such questions would raise
significant, if not prohibitive, theoretical and practical problems.
C.

A Model of Statutory Maxima
There is a third interpretation of Apprendi, which would impose heightened constitutional

procedures only when a sentence is imposed above the statutory maximum for the crime of
conviction. The statutory maximum is significant under such a theory because it marks the
maximum sentence authorized by a jury’s verdict. The Court often articulates Apprendi rights by
reference to the term “statutory maximum” and the maximum prescribed by the “legislature.”162
162

See, e.g., Blakely, 120 S. Ct. at 2536 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490)
(emphasis added)); id. at 2536 (defining “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes); Ring, 536
U.S. at 589 (noting that defendants “are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the
legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment” (emphasis added)); id. at 604
(“[I]f the legislature defines some core crime and then provides for increasing the punishment of
that crime upon a finding of some aggravating fact[,] . . . the core crime and the aggravating fact
together constitute an aggravated crime . . . .” (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added)); Harris, 536 U.S. at 549 (“Legislatures define crimes in terms of
the facts that are their essential elements, and constitutional guarantees attach to these facts.”); id.
(“After the accused is convicted, the judge may impose a sentence within a range provided by
statute, basing it on various facts relating to the defendant and the manner in which the offense
was committed.” (emphasis added)); id. at 563 (limiting McMillan’s holding “to cases that do not
involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense
established by the jury’s verdict”); id. at 565 (“[T]he facts guiding judicial discretion below the
statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (disclaiming any view “that it is
impermissible for judges to exercise discretion — taking into consideration various factors
relating both to offense and offender — in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by
statute. We have often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discretion of this
nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual case” (emphasis original));
id. at 494 n.19 (“[W]hen the term ‘sentence enhancement’ is used to describe an increase beyond
the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense than the one covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.” (emphasis added)); id. at 495
(“The degree of criminal culpability the legislature chooses to associate with particular, factually
distinct conduct has significant implications both for a defendant’s very liberty, and for the
53

But the Court has never explained why it should matter that a provision connecting criminal
conduct with punishment is legislative, rather than judicial or executive. Before addressing that
issue directly, it bears note that a theory based on statutory maxima would avoid several
problems with the substantive and judicial-discretion theories. For example, focusing on
statutory maxima explains why indeterminate sentencing is permissible: All judicial findings
and adjustments in an indeterminate system operate, by definition, underneath the maximum
prescribed by statute. Likewise, one need not probe deep meanings of “judicial discretion” or
explain why Apprendi rights turn on such discretion. Under a statutory-maximum theory, the
simple and dispositive question is whether a statute has attached a maximum sentence to a set of
criminal acts. If so, then any increase in a defendant’s sentence beyond that maximum violates
the defendant’s right to indictment and jury trial beyond reasonable doubt. This Part will argue
that the statutory-maximum model is consistent with the Court’s Apprendi jurisprudence, and
with a view of separated powers that assigns primary responsibility to legislatures for defining
criminal conduct and its maximum punishment.
1.

Theoretical Exposition

To understand why the statutory character of sentencing rules might matter, one could
first turn to Apprendi’s precursor, Jones v. United States.163 The Jones Court construed a federal
criminal statute as creating multiple “aggravated offenses,” which required indictment and jury

heightened stigma associated with an offense the legislature has selected as worthy of greater
punishment.”).
163

526 U.S. at 227.
54

trial of their “aggravating facts.”164 In the Court’s view, Congress in effect created separate
crimes by enacting a statute that imposed different maximum sentences for different criminal
conduct.165 Apprendi expanded Jones and held that the Constitution requires heightened
procedures for any provision that increases punishment above the crime of conviction’s statutory
maximum, regardless of the label used to describe that additional punishment.166 In other words,
statutes with the effect of “defining crimes” have constitutional significance regardless of their
legislative label or intended purpose.
Consistent with Jones and Apprendi, I suggest that the statutory maximum is important
because it describes the harshest punishment that the jury has authorized by its guilty verdict.167
The crime of conviction is the statutory link between culpable conduct and a maximum sentence.
The jury applies the statutory definition of that crime in finding a defendant guilty, and the same
definition sets constitutional limits on the punishment that can be imposed. Under the statutorymaximum model, the Constitution’s requirements are satisfied so long as the sentence imposed
lies beneath the statutory maximum, and it makes no constitutional difference how judicial
discretion is used, or restricted, in imposing a sub-maximal sentence.
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Id. at 251-52.
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Id.
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
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Although judges seldom if ever allow juries to know their verdict’s sentencing
consequences, see Sherry F. Colb, A Significant Decision That May Not Matter: The Supreme
Court Holds That Only Juries, Not Judges, Can Make The Factual Determinations That Increase
Sentences, at http://writ.findlaw.com/colb/20040629.html (June 29, 2004) (last visited August
31, 2004), that does not change that function of a jury’s verdict as a prerequisite to the imposition
of a legally permissible punishment.
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By its terms, the above argument explains why Apprendi should not apply to the
Sentencing Guidelines: Because the Guidelines are not statutory, they do not affect or exceed the
maximum punishment authorized by statute and the jury’s verdict.168 Under federal law,
Congress has unique authority to define crimes, and that authority manifests criminal law’s basic
concern for separation of powers.169 Courts cannot define federal crimes on their own authority,
nor can courts modify the statutory terms of a federal crime. For the executive branch to do so
would be equally unsound. The authority to define criminal conduct is reserved for Congress.
And that is true even though “nonstatutory” federal crimes could conceivably be issued with
broad public notice and could, aside from their origin, be applied to defendants just like statutory
crimes. Nor is the reservation of legislative power to define crimes is the only instance of
separated powers in criminal law. Judges cannot prosecute defendants, nor can legislatures
condemn them, even though certain “functional” aspects of those prosecutions and judgments
might be deemed acceptable if performed by entities within the proper branch. Criminal law is
one area where constitutional separations can be sharply drawn and strictly enforced.
The Sentencing Commission is an independent agent within the judicial branch.170
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See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (requiring all Guidelines to be
consistent with statutory provisions of the United States Criminal Code).
169

Cf. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001)
(“[U]nder our constitutional system . . . federal crimes are defined by statute, rather than by
common law.”); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812) (“[I]t would not
follow that the Courts of that Government are vested with jurisdiction over any particular act
done by an individual in supposed violation of the peace and dignity of the sovereign power. The
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and
declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”).
170

28 U.S.C. § 991 (establishing an “independent commission in the judicial branch of the
United States”).
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Congress did not intend to grant the Commission power to alter statutory definitions of crime by
creating sub-statutory “lesser included offenses,” such as “bank robbery without evidence of
amount.”171 As we have seen, however, legislative intent is not always dispositive for Apprendi
purposes. Indeed, if the Commission had the effective power to “expose the defendant to a
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict,” i.e., the statutory crime of
conviction, such power would without doubt be unconstitutional.172 But the Commission has no
such power. The courts of appeals had unanimously upheld the Federal Guidelines against
Apprendi challenge precisely because guideline sentencing never exceeds the statutory
maximum.173 According to the conventional narrative, Congress chose high maximum sentences
for some crimes, which in turn produced broad sentencing ranges. Congress then asked the
judicial branch to rationalize, through the newborn Sentencing Commission, judges’ discretion to
choose sentences within those statutory sentencing ranges. The Judiciary’s involvement in
sentencing policy, however, was never thought to alter the underlying crimes for which any
sentence was prescribed.174
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See generally supra 5-6 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1).
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495.
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See supra note 24 (collecting cases).
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In Mistretta v. United States, the Court upheld the Sentencing Commission against
separation of powers objections. 488 U.S. at 380-412. Justice Scalia dissented on the ground
that the Sentencing Commission impermissibly exercised no “governmental power other than the
making of laws.” Id. at 412-27. Presumably, Scalia’s objection would have been even stronger
had he also believed that the Commission was making laws that were, in effect, redefining
crimes.
57

That conventional explanation retains force. To rephrase earlier examples,175 it is
indisputable that an individual judge could make case-by-case factual findings at sentencing; an
individual judge could make those decisions using her own set of sentencing rules; and a group
several judges could opt to use the same rules. Perhaps aggressive judicial-discretion theorists
would object if sentencing rules were crafted and imposed by appellate courts instead of trial
courts.176 As discussed above, however, it seems unclear that the validity, for Fifth and Sixth
Amendment purposes, of judicially constructed sentencing rules should turn on such details.
What is important is not whether the Sentencing Commission qualifies, in Judge Posner’s words,
as a “superjudge.”177 Instead, the critical issue is that the Commission lies within the judiciary,
and it (like individual judges) operates within, and does not alter, the system of statutory rules
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See supra pp. 41-42.
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In previous discussion, that possibility was set forth as Option (5). See supra p. 42.
Incidentally, Justice Scalia’s separation of powers objection might also apply to rules from courts
of appeals; in his view, such rules might arrogate the legislative power to “mak[e] the laws.”
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413. Of course, Justice Scalia’s separation of powers objection has no
lawsuit connection to constitutional claims under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Court-watchers might nonetheless suggest that Justice Scalia’s vote in Mistretta means
that he would relish a chance to overturn the Guidelines, albeit on a different ground. Of course
anything is possible, but two contrary thoughts bear mention. First, in opinions after Mistretta,
Justice Scalia has appeared ready to apply the Guidelines on their own terms, without regard for
his view concerning their constitutionality. Second, Justice Scalia’s situation in Booker may be
similar to that in Ring, where the Court interpreted Arizona’s rules concerning “aggravating
factors.” 536 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that many States had
adopted such procedural mechanisms in response to the Supreme Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence. In Justice Scalia’s view, the Court’s decisions imposing such requirements “had
no proper foundation in the Constitution,” and he expressed “reluctance to magnify [such]
burdens . . . on the States” by requiring that aggravating factors be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Id. at 610. Scalia’s opinion in Ring nonetheless followed his views of Apprendi, not his
collateral views regarding the context to which it was applied.
177

Booker, 375 F.3d at 512.
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that defines crimes and sets the maximum punishments that are constitutionally authorized by a
jury’s guilty verdict.
2.

Doctrinal Basis

The statutory-maximum theory finds support in at least three aspects of the Court’s
post-Apprendi jurisprudence. First, the two-step analysis at Apprendi’s core indicates that, when
the legislature defines a crime, that statutory definition is constitutionally important. Legislative
definitions of crimes attach maximum sentences to criminal conduct, and those maxima cannot
be “supplemented” by “sentencing enhancements.”178 On the contrary, to impose a
super-maximal sentence effectively defines a “new crime,” and constitutional protections are
necessary for each of that crime’s elements.
Conversely, the statutory-maximum theory suggests that Congress’s definition of a crime
is unaltered by nonstatutory “sentencing limitations.” Under such a view, Apprendi’s procedural
protections would apply if and only if a defendant is convicted under the definition of one crime,
and sentenced under a different one. The Federal Guidelines do not trigger such constitutional
requirements because they lack the authority to create a lesser crime, and they have no effect on
the scope of a defendant’s conviction. As discussed above, it makes little sense to describe the
Guidelines’ base offense level as “redefining” a defendant’s crime of conviction, and no one
would say such a thing current parlance.179 Everything that occurs under the Guidelines,
including all judicial factfinding, is designed to, and does in fact, operate beneath the

178

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490-497.
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See supra page 25.
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congressionally prescribed maximum punishment.180
Second, Justice Scalia’s Blakely opinion conflicts, at least in part, with any theory based
on judicial discretion. Washington sought to defend its statutory scheme by arguing that the
fifty-three month “standard sentencing range” was not a true statutory maximum because the trial
judge retained discretion to depart from that range, even on grounds that were not enumerated
within any statute.181 That discretion did not change Blakely’s result. Justice Scalia responded to
one of the dissents by saying that “the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on
judicial power, but a reservation of jury power. It limits judicial power only to the extent that the
claimed judicial power infringes on the province of the jury.”182 Similarly, it is irrelevant that
nonstatutory Federal Guidelines may restrict judicial discretion, resulting in a lower offense level
than the maximum authorized by the statute. Effects on judicial discretion are, without more,
categorically insufficient to change a crime’s statutory definition and maximum.
Justice Scalia in Apprendi wrote that, after a valid conviction, the Constitution allows
defendants to receive far less than the statutory maximum through the “mercy of a tenderhearted
judge,” early release due to a “tenderhearted parole commission,” or a commutation a
“tenderhearted governor.”183 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are seldom called
“tenderhearted,” but the operative fact is the same. Under the Guidelines, “the criminal will
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See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (requiring all Guidelines to be
consistent with statutory provisions of the United States Criminal Code).
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Respondent’s Br. at 21-26, Blakely (No. 02-1632).
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Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2531.
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Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the crime.”184 Put precisely, no
defendant will receive a greater punishment than what the statute defining the crime authorizes
upon a jury’s conviction.
Third, the Court has repeatedly referred to modern legislatures’ ability to structure the
discretion of sentencing judges.185 Even Justice Scalia’s Blakely opinion disclaimed “find[ing]
determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional.”186 Rather, the Court addressed how a system
of determinate sentencing “could be implemented in a way that respects the Sixth
Amendment.”187 That suggestion would seem illusory, and perhaps disingenuous, if the
application of Blakely’s analysis were to find that determinate sentencing could only be
implemented by placing all facts that might increase the “base offense level” in an indictment
and proving them to a jury beyond reasonable doubt.
The cornerstone of all determinate sentencing regimes is a judge’s rule-bound
responsibility for making post-conviction findings and prescribing a sentence. Such systems
could hardly function if every post-conviction finding that “increased” a sentence above
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Id.
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See, e.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 558 (plurality) (“In the latter part of the 20th century,
many legislatures, dissatisfied with sentencing disparities among like offenders, implemented
measures regulating judicial discretion. These systems maintained the statutory ranges and the
judge’s factfinding role but assigned a uniform weight to factors judges often relied upon when
choosing a sentence.”).
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Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting Washington Br. 34).
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Id. Any tension between this formalism and Apprendi’s statement that “the relevant
inquiry is one not of form, but of effect” is superficial. 530 U.S. at 495. The latter inquiry was
whether the “required finding expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Id. The question of what the jury’s verdict authorizes is
necessarily formal, at least in part. See infra pp. 53-58.
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nonstatutory base offense levels had to be listed in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond
reasonable doubt. What would a judge be left to “determine” at sentencing? The ministerial
results of the jury’s findings? Findings that could only reduce a defendant’s sentence? Any such
result would seem extraordinary in light of Justice Scalia’s assertion that he was not “find[ing]
determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional,” but was only invalidating certain of their
procedural incarnations.188
Under a statutory-maximum theory of Apprendi, by contrast, it is relatively easy to
identify which determinate sentencing schemes are unconstitutional. Invalid systems are ones
that effectively prescribe one statutory maximum, attached to lesser crime, yet allow imposition
of a greater sentence pursuant to what is in effect the statutory definition of a second, greater
crime. Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely all involved such unconstitutional schemes, but Booker does
not.
3.

Objections And Responses

Opposition to a statutory-maximum theory derives from its preoccupation with legislative
action. Its strongest form, advanced by Judge Posner, argues that applying Apprendi to
congressional rules, but not to Commission Guidelines, absurdly implies that “an administrative
agency is to be deemed a more responsible, a more authoritative, fount of criminal law than a
legislature.”189 How can the Commission do by guideline what Congress cannot by statute?
As previous discussion suggests,190 that characterization builds from a flawed premise.
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Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting Washington Br. 34).
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Booker, 375 F.3d at 512.

190

See supra pp. 52-62.
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Under the statutory-maximum model, constitutional analysis is different for statutory and
nonstatutory judicial rules because of Congress’s unique authority to define crimes and prescribe
statutory maxima. It is what the Commission cannot do that creates the constitutional difference.
The statutory-maximum theory provides that, for constitutional purposes, the congressionally
prescribed maximum is what governs, and such statutory rules present the (otherwise elusive)
“baseline” against which any impermissibly “increased” sentence is measured.191
No judicial rule, despite its practical and legal force as a limit on judicial discretion, can
create “lesser included offenses” where Congress has not done so. If a jury convicts of bank
robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), with a twenty-year maximum sentence, that is the crime of
conviction, and that is the maximum sentence. Not more, but also not less. An entity within the
Judicial Branch may create rules that limit judicial discretion and reduce some defendants’
statistically expected sentence, but such an entity cannot lower a federal crime’s statutory
maximum nor redefine the statutory crime of conviction. As a pragmatist, Judge Posner
implicitly characterizes what a sentencing rule “does” by its effect on defendants and, perhaps,
on judges’ discretion. Each of those standards, however, is a problematic basis for interpreting
Apprendi.192
A weaker version of the same critique might accuse the statutory-maximum model of
“formalism.” How can it matter whether a particular rule is applied by statute or by guideline,
when their effects on defendants and judges is the same? Again, however, one must note that
substantive effects on defendants and judicial discretion often lack dispositive weight under
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Apprendi. From a defendant’s perspective, indeterminate sentencing could permissibly impose
punishment in any case (or, with imagination, in every case) identical to the sentence imposed
under the Federal Guidelines. On the facts of Apprendi, New Jersey’s legislature could raise the
statutory maximum for unlawful firearm possession to twenty years, and state judges could in
every case (at the legislature’s “suggestion”) apply the top half of that range only after
themselves finding that the offense qualified as a hate crime. It seems equally clear that New
Jersey could, after raising the statutory maximum to twenty years, impose a statutory minimum
of ten years for hate crimes.
For an overly vigorous critic of the statutory-maximum model, Apprendi itself could be
derided as “formalist” because it applies differently to regimes with the same effect for
defendants and sentencing judges. Indeed, Apprendi’s dissenters have continuously attacked that
feature of the Court’s jurisprudence,193 and Justice O’Connor would almost certainly repeat that
critique today.194 Such analysis might lead one to reject Apprendi as a whole, but it should not
invalidate the Guidelines.
From a different perspective, to accuse Apprendi of formalism is just another way to say
that the case protects other values. Apprendi exists neither to protect defendants from judicially
determined punishment, nor to ensure the predominance of individual judges in determining such
punishment. Instead, Apprendi is a narrower rule that requires a connection between the
legislature’s definition of a crime, a jury’s verdict of conviction, and the maximum that may be
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imposed for that crime. In Justice Scalia’s terms, Apprendi is not a “mere procedural formality,”
designed to benefit criminal defendants, but is “a fundamental reservation of power in our
constitutional structure.”195 It is a systemic rule that preserves a jury’s importance in authorizing
a defendant’s maximum sentence, but also respects legislative authority to define the maximum
punishment for criminal conduct, and to structure judicial sentencing beneath that statutory
maximum.
Finally, although Apprendi does not yield any profound substantive rights for criminal
defendants, it remains an important landmark in constitutional law. As Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion explains, had Apprendi been decided otherwise — allowing a defendant to be
convicted of one crime and punished above that crime’s maximum sentence — the right to a jury
trial would be wholly contingent on legislative preference.196 Justice Scalia’s language was
strong, and he dared the dissenters to articulate a different constitutional view: “What ultimately
demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are unable to say what the right to trial by jury
does guarantee if, as they assert, it does not guarantee — what it has been assumed to guarantee
throughout our history — the right to have a jury determine those facts that determine the
maximum sentence the law allows. They provide no coherent alternative.”197 That challenge
remains unmet. Thus, until a better theory of Apprendi rights emerges — or until jury rights are
conceded to be a matter for legislative choice — the statutory-maximum model stands as a
principled explanation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, with deep roots in constitutional
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separation of powers, respect for indeterminate sentencing, and legislative power to define crimes
and prescribe maximum punishments.
III.

Constitutional Rulemaking and Booker
In Booker, amidst great uproar, the Court will answer the controversial and important

question of whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional. The public outcry
surrounding that decision is itself significant, and although the public reaction is partly motivated
by the legal issues’ magnitude, it also stems from a perceived “chaos” that has arisen after
Blakely. According to conventional wisdom, Blakely’s merits and its chaos go hand in hand.
Recent disruptions in the criminal legal system are hailed by some as overdue “growing pains”
through which courts must confront the inevitable fact that the Guidelines are unconstitutional.198
Such disruptions are reviled by other jurists as a “natural disaster” that has brewed since
Apprendi and has now overflowed.199 From both perspectives, systemic disarray is the direct and
inevitable result of the applicable constitutional principle. In such commentators’ view, apart
from a different result in Blakely or Apprendi, the current upheaval could not have been helped.
The interpretation of Apprendi set forth in Part II conflicts with that account. This Article
argues that there is nothing “inevitable” about the result in Booker. On the contrary, the Court
has a fractured view of Apprendi’s meaning, and the outcome in the pending cases will depend
on Justice Scalia’s swing vote, which has proved hard to predict, from Apprendi (where he joined
most of Justice Thomas’s concurrence), to Harris (where he joined Apprendi’s dissenters), to
Ring and Blakely (where Apprendi’s majority was reunited). The statutory-maximum approach
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also suggests that this summer’s confusion was anything but “natural.” Apprendi did not itself
require any such upheaval, which is why every court of appeals had earlier upheld the Guidelines
as constitutional.200 Whatever has happened in the judicial system between Blakely and Booker,
this Article implies that it is not the simple result of those two cases’ substantive significance.
In this Part, I will use the uncertainty surrounding the Court’s Booker decision to analyze
how different actors contributed to making the road from Blakely to Booker so uneven. Although
the Blakely “crisis” may seem historically anomalous, the behavior of various entities in the
process provides a negative case study of how national judicial rules can be developed.
Regardless of how the Court decides the pending guideline cases, it is not too early to examine
recent events for broader lessons about legal institutions’ behavior regarding Blakely, in the hope
that such insights might apply outside the sentencing sphere and might mitigate the risk of
similar judicial “crises” in the future.
Such analysis might begin by imagining that the Booker Court were to adopt the
statutory-maximum model and uphold the Guidelines. Under that scenario, Blakely’s statement
that it “express[ed] no view” of the Guidelines would prove similar to Apprendi’s claim that it
did not address mandatory minima (which Harris later upheld).201 Of course, one could criticize
Blakely’s ambiguous language defining “statutory maxima” as ambiguous,202 but the Court’s
opinion also might have been distorted by its inability, as a five-vote majority, to agree on what
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should be said about the Guidelines.203
By contrast, the dissenters’ strong rhetoric and post-decision comments were
unconstrained by the bureaucratic need to attract votes.204 There is a wide range of reasonable
views on the proper role of judicial dissents, especially those of Supreme Court Justices.205 But
in discussing the Guidelines’ constitutionality, which presented an issue of obvious national
importance and uncertain result, Blakely’s dissenters would have been well-served to maintain a
more judicious tone. The Court’s highest tradition of dissents could trace to Brandeis, Harlan,
Holmes, and others whose powerful words coincided with, and perhaps helped to cause, a
principled change in favor of their views.206 The dramatic rhetoric of Blakely’s dissenters,
however, only gave shelter to their enemies. Thus, those who argue that the Guidelines are
unconstitutional now are able to cite Blakely’s dissents as a primary proof.207 Perhaps Blakely’s
dissenters were trying to force a decision regarding the Federal Guidelines, to persuade a swing
voter to change, to draw public attention, or just to vent after losing another battle over Apprendi.
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Whatever the goal, it is clear that those dissents have had serious unintended consequences that,
given subsequent events, have tended to tip the balance against the dissenters’ legal position.
The second major contribution to Blakely’s aftermath came from the courts of appeals,
whose speedy and bold reactions to Blakely also tested the limits of their proper role. Blakely
was decided on June 24, 2004.208 After only ten business days, on July 9, 2004, Judge Posner
issued an opinion for the Seventh Circuit finding the Guidelines unconstitutional.209 On July 14,
Judge Merritt did likewise for the Sixth Circuit, followed by Judge Paez for the Ninth Circuit on
July 21, and by Judges Lay and Bright for the Eighth Circuit on July 23.210 On July 12, Second
Circuit certified the Guidelines’ constitutionality to the Supreme Court, and the Second Circuit,
as though it were an overeager litigant, “request[ed]” that the Supreme Court hold expedited
briefing and argument during its summer recess.211
Putting aside the merits of those cases, their most remarkable characteristic may be their
speed. Anyone who has studied or practiced in the federal appellate system knows that such
quick decisions are truly remarkable. Perhaps acknowledging that fact, Judge Posner sought to
explain his need for speed: “We have expedited our decision in an effort to provide some
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guidance to the district judges (and our own court’s staff), who are faced with an avalanche of
motions for resentencing in the light of [Blakely].”212 The credibility of that rationale, however,
is reduced by historical context. After Apprendi, defendants in every federal court, including the
Seventh Circuit, filed numerous challenges to the Guidelines’ constitutionality. Every court of
appeals ultimately rejected those claims.213 Moreover, no court of appeals heard oral argument
and decided such issues in the span of two weeks. Why the sudden rush to accept a
constitutional claim that the appellate courts, including the Supreme Court in its certiorari
practice, had unanimously ignored since Apprendi was decided five years earlier?214
Without a doubt, the appellate courts’ haste partly owes to certain judges’ belief that
Blakely (unlike Apprendi) held the Guidelines unconstitutional, a belief that I do not share.215
Yet even that appraisal of the merits may have been influenced by the uncommon speed of the
process. Complexities often seem simpler when time is short. In any event, two more dubious
motives are also possible. First, Judge Posner’s opinion seems to express interest in forcing
constitutional questions regarding the Federal Guidelines into the Supreme Court.216 The Second
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Circuit’s certification decision is a more direct expression of similar sentiments.217 Such lower
federal judges’ desire to place their cases on the Supreme Court’s docket is a rarity in modern
practice, and one that seems quite outside such judges’ proper role. One obvious aspect of the
modern shift toward discretionary certiorari jurisdiction (as opposed to Supreme Court appeals of
right) is the congressional policy to grant the Supreme Court authority and discretion to
determine its own caseload.218 Naturally, there are rare circumstances that would call for lower
courts to act quickly in order to deal with a particularly exigent circumstances.219 There is
serious reason to doubt, however, that Blakely presented such circumstances.
The desire for quick review by the Supreme Court likely derived from a sense that
Blakely’s failure to consider the Federal Guidelines left significant “unfinished business” for the
Court to address. Insofar as appellate judges sincerely sought to accelerate their cases in order to
“aid” the Supreme Court in attending to its work, they ignored the obvious fact that cases in the
federal appellate courts have generated — for several years — more than enough petitions for
certiorari raising that issue. At this point, the Supreme Court needed no additional help. More
likely, the appellate courts were (not so) subtly criticizing the Court’s Blakely decision. Judge
Posner, perhaps his generation’s most renowned judge, must have known that his Booker opinion
would cause significant controversy, and would also encourage other courts to decide quickly,
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perhaps agreeably to his approach. The quick release of Judge Posner’s opinion assured its
position as a resource, intellectually and politically, for other judges inclined to invalidate the
Guidelines. And the more judges invalidated the Guidelines, the quicker the Court would have
to intervene. Indeed, that is just what happened.220
Another questionable factor in some judges’ decisions might be their antipathy toward the
Guidelines, which limit judicial power and can require extraordinarily harsh sentences. As one
commentator put it, “The most public, steady, and compelling criticism of the guidelines has
come from federal judges. . . . Judges [have spoken] early and often about their displeasure with
the sentencing rules.” Although Judge Merritt has participated in debates over guideline policy,
it is not clear whether any other appellate judge involved with post-Blakely decisions has strong
views about the Guidelines.221 Much less could one suggest that any such predilections could
have affected a court’s decision about timing or otherwise. The more limited point is that
appearances often matter in judicial business, and, if the Guidelines are upheld, the speed and
merits of the recent court of appeals’ decisions could be reexamined in a critical light. The very
possibility of that reexamination, combined with ample opportunity for more measured
consideration, is sufficient to recommend a more patient approach, which would have allowed
appellate and certiorari practice to run at a pace closer to normal.
Thus far, I have examined post-Blakely conduct on the assumption that the Booker Court
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will uphold the Federal Guidelines. On the opposite assumption — that the Court invalidates the
Guidelines — the behavior of different entities comes into focus. For example, an important
contributor to the post-Blakely “chaos” is the federal government, whose litigation tactics
unintentionally fed the frenzy. Of particular note is the government’s decision to support the
State of Washington as an amicus curiae, and its seemingly gratuitous prediction to the Court
that, if Washington lost in Blakely, “[i]t is . . . not certain that this Court would ultimately
conclude that the differences between the Washington system and the federal Guidelines are of
constitutional magnitude.”222 Although such words in the abstract may seem mild, to the Booker
Court, they risk projecting a forecast of defeat. Perhaps no appraisal of the government’s
litigation tactics in Blakely can escape the distortions of hindsight, but the statutory-maximum
theory in Part II and the Apprendi analysis in Part I at least suggest that the government could
have kept its powder dry in Blakely, or at least could have struck a slightly different tone to
mitigate risks that losing Blakely would be given undue importance in the now-pending federal
cases.
One last institution warranting attention is the Court itself, and in particular its practice
regarding petitions of certiorari, which will be subject to significant criticism if the Guidelines
are held unconstitutional. As discussed previously, the Court has for years denied the petitions of
federal defendants who sought to challenge the Guidelines on Apprendi grounds.223 If those
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denials caused thousands of defendants to be sentenced under a scheme that the Court believes is
unconstitutional, and, as appeals became final, caused thousands of other defendants to lose their
right to challenge such sentences, then the Court’s refusal to grant certiorari could become hard
to understand.224
The best explanation for such pre-Blakely denials of certiorari is that one or more Justices
were at the time uncertain about the Guidelines’ constitutional status. Absent a circuit conflict,
the Court is often justified in avoiding questions, even important ones, where the Justices are
unsure of the result. When certiorari was granted in Blakely, however, the landscape changed.
Similarities between the content of Washington’s system and the Federal Guidelines illustrated
that the Guidelines’ constitutionality could be implicated, and the possibility of “avoiding” the
question became increasingly remote. Furthermore, at the time certiorari was granted, and while
Blakely was pending, the Court had ample opportunity to grant a federal “companion case,”
which would directly raise the Federal Guidelines’ constitutionality, if the Court believed that the
federal Guidelines walked in constitutional lockstep with Washington’s statutory scheme.225
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Although the above discussion uses alternate hypotheses (“What if the Guidelines are
constitutional? What if they are not?”) to highlight the conduct of different entities, most of the
emergent institutional lessons are quite independent of what the Booker Court ultimately does.226
For example, a more restrained judicial role would be commendable for the dissenting Justices
and the courts of appeals regardless of whether their substantive analysis ultimately proves
correct and the Guidelines are struck down. Similarly, the government’s Blakely brief could have
been more moderate regardless of the result in Booker. For the Court to invalidate the Guidelines
might suggest that the government put too many eggs in Blakely’s basket, and endangered its
subsequent credibility in seeking to distinguish the Guidelines from Washington’s failed
statutory system. Alternatively, if the Booker Court rules in the government’s favor, that might
imply (as Part I indicates) that the best strategy would have been not to participate in Blakely at
all.
The disruption that arise from Blakely to Booker derives from a combination of actions
undertaken by various repeat players in the federal judicial system, in a context where the Court’s
jurisprudence was so recent and dynamic that significant tentativeness would have been
appropriate. The dissenters’ strong rhetoric, and Justice O’Connor’s public comments, initiated a
substantial media spectacle; the lower federal courts, led by the nation’s most prominent court of
appeals judge, validated those fears nearly immediately; and government lawyers have continued
to litigate, trying to ignore the failed “line in the sand” that seemed to be drawn in Blakely. Other
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courts, commentators, and practitioners have now joined the fray, and discussions have largely
turned to what should happen after the Court invalidates the Guidelines, with less attention to
whether the Court should do so, and if so why. This Article has analyzed those latter questions,
but in doing so, it has suggested that the chaotic events since Blakely are no “earthquake” arising
from inevitable natural forces. They are a product of various institutional choices, many of
which stretched or exceeded the limits of their proper role. To recognize the existence and
importance of such decisions may be the first step toward a discussion of the most suitable ways
to cope with the perennial problems of incomplete constitutional rules and undertheorized Court
decisions, both of which are well illustrated by Blakely itself.227 In the pending guideline cases, it
might seem unfortunate that the constitutionality of the Guidelines, and in many respects the
future of federal criminal law, must now be decided under turbulent and accelerated
circumstances. The chain of post-Blakely events reveal how some participants in the federal
appellate system could have ameliorated the “crisis,” and that illustration in turn identifies the
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importance of adherence to institutional roles within a system of constitutional rulemaking.
IV.

CONCLUSION
At the very least, the path from Blakely to Booker has made for captivating judicial

theater. The current “scene” has three main characters. One is Justice Stevens, Apprendi’s
author and architect, for whom the Sentencing Revolution derives from a longstanding
opposition to mandatory minima228 and a broad concern to provide criminal defendants with
robust, fair procedures.229 Second is Justice Breyer, who drafted and defended the Guidelines as
an original member of the Sentencing Commission; those Guidelines constitute his most
significant legal product to date and are a major part of his potential legacy. Third is Justice
Scalia, who must decide which of his colleagues will prevail. For Scalia, Booker presents a
jurisprudential tension: He long opposed the Guidelines on separation of powers grounds,230 yet
separation of powers principles lead to upholding those Guidelines against Fifth and Sixth
Amendment challenges.231 Scalia authored Blakely, which has been credited (and blamed) with
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threatening the Guidelines, but he is also well-known for seeking elegant rules; the
statutory-maximum theory would provide such a rule, and would also avoid inserting courts into
detailed substantive oversight of criminal law.
Of course, we cannot know what will happen. But it is important that neither the intraCourt drama, nor the immense social and political consequences that hang in the balance, should
submerge the basic constitutional questions presented, questions that merit careful theoretical and
doctrinal analysis. This Article has sought to identify the most important issue that remains
unanswered after Blakely: whether nonstatutory sentencing rules are constitutionally regulated by
Apprendi. And it has proposed a theory of Apprendi rights that is consistent with this country’s
history of indeterminate sentencing, which grants judges the authority to control actual
punishment, and with legislative primacy to define crimes and their maximum punishment. If
the Court were to adopt that theory, it would uphold the Federal Guidelines. However, if the
Guidelines do not survive Booker, the problems identified in this Article provide an open
challenge for future interpretations of Apprendi. The Court has never articulated a plausible
alternative to the statutory-maximum model, and if it seeks to do so in Booker, a great deal of
new theoretical and explanatory work will need to be done.
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